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PAST & PRESENT

No. 52 SEPTEMBER 1992

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CARTWRIGHT'S WATERLOO
THE MATCHLOCK MUSKET
FIRST WORLD WAR SNIPERS
THE BRITISH RESISTANCE

'HITLER JUGEND' DIVISION
IN NORMANDY 1944
MONTROSE'S ARMY
THE SUFFOLK REGIMENT



MILITARY ILLUSTRATED

□ PAST & PRESENT □

No. 52

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THERE IS NOT a lot to report this month, although one item which will please many people is that The Parachute Regiment barracks gate guardian — 1943 Dakota KP208 — has finally been restored to its former glory. The Dakota, which has been standing guard in front of Browning Barracks for 20 years, has had its paintwork completely stripped and has now been repainted in D-Day colours. This is actually a minor 'liberty', because the aircraft itself was principally used as a VIP transport. Most of the work was undertaken by The Lindsay Group of Glasgow.

Lionel Leventhal informs us that he is organising a Military Book Showcase at the Royal Aeronautical Society, 4 Hamilton Place, London W1, from 3pm to 7pm on Wednesday, 14 October. On show will be the entire lists of Greenhill Books, Presidio Press, Airline, Leo Cooper, Aerospace Publishing, the US Naval Institute, TAB-Aero and the Smithsonian Institution Press. Admission is by invitation only, and any reader who

EDITOR'S NOTES



The Parachute Regiment Dakota during restoration.

wishes to avail himself of the opportunity should write to Mr Leventhal at Park House, 1 Russel Gardens, London NW11 9NN.

The 1992 Miniature Armoured Fighting Vehicle Association National Championships will be held on Sunday, 31 October, at St Margaret's Church Hall, Putney Park Lane, London SW15. The competition is divided into 25 classes with a special theme class of '1942 — 50 years on'. For further details, send a SAE to: Danny Taylor, 14 Denbridge Road, Bromley, Kent BR1 2AG.

Finally, the North Herts Branch of the British Model Soldier Society are holding an open day entitled Model Showcase '92 at Pinston Hall, Letchworth, on Sunday, 8 November. In addition to the model exhibits there will be trade stands, open competitions, re-enactment groups and a selection of WWII AFVs. Admission is £1, senior citizens 50p; children under 10 free. For further details 'phone Alan Jones on 0462 676020.

Bruce Quarrie

Michael Wittmann

Dear Sir,
I have in front of me a copy of 'M' No 48, which contains among other articles a piece by Gregory Jones on the German tankcr Michael Wittmann. One area in which I do feel that Jones is 'off target' is in the matter of Wittmann's kills on that day. He credits the German with no less than '21 tanks, 28 half-tracks and many more softskins, single-handedly...'. This is an assertion which I have seen repeated many times, and although the figures vary slightly, the number of actual tanks is frequently put at more than 20.

Now, I am aware that Tiger 1 carried 92 rounds of 8.8cm ammunition, but from the plans in Spielberger's book, I would estimate that only 24 of these may be regarded as 'ready use', since (in common with most tanks of the period) the bulk of the ammunition is stored in sponson racks which are largely inaccessible in a moving vehicle in action. Indeed, my correspondence with an ex-Sherman troop leader confirmed that sponson racks were generally used for longer-term storage, rounds from here being used to replenish the ready racks during laagers. I doubt that things were much different in the Panzerwaffe, especially given the bulk and mass of an 8.8cm shell. This lack of easily-accessible shells presents to me the interesting question as to how Wittmann managed to brew up Jones's alleged 49 AFVs (some admittedly better-armoured than others) plus all those softskins with a mere 24 ready rounds and his machine-guns! Surely he cannot have hit more than one vehicle with every single one of his shots?

I confess that Jones's account seems a little improbable to me.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

and I find Dick Harley's tally of 25 'AFVs', comprising four 75mm-armed Cromwells, two OP Cromwells, Stuarts, half-tracks and carriers rather more credible. It also occurs that part of the reason for Wittmann's departure from the town after meeting the Firefly at the western end may have been that he became aware of his ammunition state and felt that a shooting match with a troop of tanks including at least one Firefly would be undesirable at that point. Clearly he had not run out completely, however, since he was able to destroy the remaining Cromwell of RHO (Captain Dyas) when it met him around the bend in the road.

Robert Iockie, Wimbledon.

Dear Sir,
Mr Jones is to be congratulated on an extremely well-written and interesting article, which gives great credit to his subject: Wittmann's action in Normandy is well documented, but few writers have ever provided any information on his background or early life. Although Wittmann was one of the most highly-decorated soldiers in the Wehrmacht, he was apparently a shy, retiring man and few researchers have been able to provide any insight into his personality.

I hope that I will not cause any offence if I attempt to clarify a few small points in the text; these are not implied as criticisms of Mr Jones' work, merely to add some input to it.

Firstly, upon Wittmann's enlistment in the Allgemeine-SS: as opposed to SS-Sturm 1/92 at Ingolstadt, the unit should be described as Sturm 1 of SS-

Standarte 92 at Ingolstadt. If Wittmann was issued with a pair of collar patches during his short time at that unit, these would have borne the Standarte number 92.

Secondly, during Operation 'Citadel', the battle for the Kursk-Byelgorod salient, the LSSAH was still referred to in the Order of Battle as being an SS-Panzer Grenadier Division as were 'Das Reich' and 'Totenkopf'. This was despite the fact that they possessed the strength of a fully-fledged Panzer division, having a full armoured regiment as opposed to the tank battalion of a Panzer Grenadier division. They were re-designated as SS-Panzer divisions on 22 October 1943, the change being in name only.

Thirdly, the two uniform plates by Paul Hannon accompanying the article are excellent and capture the likeness of Wittmann well, but I feel I must disagree with the description of his black Panzer uniform as being 'fairly casually rebadged'. It was not unusual for Waffen-SS officers in the field to adopt other ranks' collar patches and badges of rank, because the bright silver SS runes and silver piping made excellent targets for snipers. This was particularly so in Russia. A second reason is that many Waffen-SS officers wore OR's rank insignia in a conscious attempt to identify with the troops under their command. There were many in the Waffen-SS hierarchy who despised the German Army and all it stood for, and wished to discard the look of the Prussian officer altogether. Waffen-SS officers were taught and expected to lead from the front and by example, and so many actively sought to

dress in the same manner as their soldiers. Hence the image of the Waffen-SS commander wearing camouflage clothing, short boots and gaiters, and OR's insignia or no insignia at all — a new type of leader who 'got his hands dirty' along with his troops.

It must also be remembered that many promotions were awarded under field conditions, and that the correct insignia were not always available at the time, sewing on new badges of rank largely became a matter of improvising, sometimes modifying the wearer's existing insignia.

Lastly, on the second colour plate of Wittmann wearing the leather U-boat jacket and M43 Einheitsfeldmütze, the photograph on which this illustration is presumably based appears in Volume 1 of *Uniforms, Organisation and History of the Waffen-SS* by Roger James Bender and Hugh Page Taylor, and whilst it would have been feasible for Wittmann to have worn blue overalls under his leather jacket it would seem strange to attach a full set of collar insignia to them. It was possible to fasten the collar of the black Panzer jacket up to the neck and wear the Knight's Cross at the throat, and quite a lot of photographs have appeared of SS Panzer crewmen wearing U-boat 'leathers' with the collar of the black or field-grey tunic showing, or folded over the collar of the leather jacket to display the rank and tunic insignia. This is yet another permutation out of many, as we know that soldiers in the field are wont to dress for comfort, indeed, a print exists of Jochen Peiper wearing a U-boat jacket over a white roll-neck woollen sweater yet still displaying the Ritterkreuz around his neck!

Chris Oldfield, Watford


THE 1991/92 auction season is nearing its end and as always on such occasions there has been a degree of 'looking back'. If one can sum up it is probably fair to say that there is a general, if somewhat restrained, feeling that the market might just be looking up. There is no sense that the good old days are just around the corner but on the whole the trade feels that it detects a small but hopeful trend towards more activity and better prices. This movement, if it continues, means that people may just be becoming more inclined to offer goods to the auctions. This, in turn, could help stimulate a somewhat lethargic buyer's market. There can be no doubt that the arms and armour trade is unlikely to experience a dramatic pick-up until the recession really begins to ease and the signs of such a change are contradictory.

If there has indeed been any upswing in trade, can it be said to be general or is it particular? There seems to be no disputing that the demand for British campaign medals continues to be strong and this side of the militaria market has certainly shown no signs of any fall

This group shot gives some idea of the range of Sotheby's September's Military Theme Sale including the uniforms of a Field Marshal, regimental drums, Crimean shako, Brown Bess musket and bayonet and, in the can, the shako of an officer of the Madras Native Infantry.



THE AUCTION SCENE



A superb cased pair of over and under flintlock pistols by the master London gunmaker John Manton dating from around 1808. They are in fine condition with some original colour and are complete with all the fittings. (Estimate £4,000-£4,500.)

in prices. Sotheby's, Christies and other auction rooms have seen prices either remain static or else increase and the Glendinning sale of the Jubilee Collection was a rousing success. The simultaneous appearance of 60 Waterloo medals did nothing to reduce the price realised and the rarer items went even better than was expected.

In the general field of arms and armour there has not been a great deal of movement, but the market must be grateful that at least things have not got no worse. The number of auction sales has undoubtedly decreased and there have been few sales like the blockbusters of the past. If one can sum up it is probably fair to say that good material has continued to sell but the lower

range material has seen little improvement in demand. Buyers have, in general, been more discriminating and bought with care and discretion. The days when an ill-considered or hasty purchase usually meant only a potential small loss have gone and today mistakes are likely to prove expensive. Another factor which has sharpened the buyers' perception has been the number of reliable books on the market and the average collector is now far better informed than his predecessor.

It has become even more important for the auctioneers to be more prudent for any lot which fails to sell represents financial loss both in the expense of catalogue printing and stall time. Some houses are

endeavouring to improve cash flow by rejecting the lower valued items in the belief that the time taken to catalogue, handle and process a cheap object is not covered by the income from the 20% commission — ten from the buyer and probably 10 — it may be lower — from the vendor. It is a policy that can be counter-productive for clients can be told that a piece is worth so much but that this is too low a figure to be included in the sale. The owner may well be a little upset and should they have something of greater value they may be inclined not to bother with that house again but try a different house instead.

Some rooms are finding difficulty in finding stock at the lower end of the price market and some dealers are being pressured into offering lots. Trade input to auctions can be somewhat hazardous since the dealer has his eye, quite rightly, on his profit margin and if he purchased in auction and then sells by the same means he must ask at least 10% more than he paid just to cover commission charges. In fact it may be necessary to increase this

The helmet was that of an officer of pikemen circa 1640 and is of good quality whilst the armour is that of an ordinary pikeman and has been modified but is quite typical of that in use during the English Civil Wars. The helmet is estimated at £800-£1,000 whilst the armour is expected to realise from £600-£800.




margin since the auction incurs other charges which he will want to cover.

Looking ahead to the forthcoming sales there was to have been a good mixed sale of arms and armour at Christies on 22 July with over 250 lots which include some very choice items. The catalogue is, as always, very well produced and illustrated. It will be interesting to see if the so-called revival does push up prices. In the previous week there was a sale of modern and vintage firearms including a Webley Fosbery scil cocking revolver, weapons which are now fetching prices in excess of £1,000. Looking further ahead to the next season the same rooms have the second part of the Dyck sale and there is no doubt that the material will sell as well as the previous lots.

Sotheby's have two theme sales planned for September, an aviation and a military sale. It is rumoured that the medal section of the avia-

Surely the smallest cased pair of percussion duelling pistols ever, shown here actual size. (Estimate £1,000-£1,500.)



tion sale will include an extremely important gallantry award but at the moment the wraps are on. The military sale has some very good firearms including an extremely choice flintlock pistol from Tippoo Sahib who died after the battle of Seringapatam in 1799. It has the usual large silver tiger head butt cap and other features typical of this group of weapons. The same sale includes uniforms, medals and

some armour and edged weapons.

Uniforms figured prominently in Christies, South Kensington, sale on 11 June. Sabretaches sold well, averaging around £1,000. A number of pieces, mostly swords, from the Dyck collection were included and all fetched good prices. A collection of uniform items of an officer of 3rd Skinner's Horse sold for the considerable sum of £950 whilst a similar lot for Prince Albert's

Leicestershire Yeomanry Cavalry did even better at £1,700. A fine officer's helmet of the 2nd Life Guards sold for £2,000 and an Austrian dragoon helmet sold for £1,000. The percentage of lots unsold was 7.5%, a very good result on which to end the season for this figure, known in the trade as the BI, is taken as an indicator of the sales success — or failure!

Frederick Wilkinson

Videos to buy

The Occult History of the Third Reich (Time-Life Video)

Encyclopedia of World War Two (Time-Life Video)

Air Power (Time-Life Video)

TIME-LIFE VIDEO have released three sets of videos of interest to the military buff. The four volumes of *The Occult History of the Third Reich* argue that political explanations are insufficient for the appalling phenomenon of the Third Reich and the Messianic appeal of Adolph Hitler. Instead, they stress the influence of occultists whose fantasies found expression in secret societies which espoused racist doctrines of Aryo-Germanic supremacy. These societies were the result of a late-19th century revival of interest in the occult, a reaction to increasing industrialisation and democratisation. Their adherents blamed the humiliation of the Armistice at the end of World War I principally on either the Communists or the Jews.

Part One, *The Enigma of the Swastika*, traces the history of the use of the symbol. Russian theosophist Helene Petrova Blavatsky claimed secret occult teachings were revealed to her in Tibet. They prophesied that the Aryans, the fifth of seven root races each associated with a cosmic cycle, were destined to lead a fallen world back to pure spirit. The sign of the Aryan was the swastika, symbol of the sun, fire and creation, and the most potent of seven esoteric symbols. The popular German occultist Guido von List, founder of the List Society, recognised the swastika as an ancient Germanic nine symbolising the sun-wheel of the God of creation.

During World War I it frequently decorated amulets and talismans worn by German and Austrian soldiers as a symbol of militant German nationalism. In 1918, it became the symbol of the Thule Society, the Munich lodge of the anti-Semitic and counter-revolu-

tionary Germanenorden society. Two years later it was adopted by its successor, the German Workers' Party (DAP), which itself became the National Socialist or Nazi Party. The final form was chosen by Adolph Hitler, and implicitly symbolised the creation of a new Aryo-Germanic millennium.

The SS: Blood and Soil traces the origins of the SS before it was created as Hitler's personal bodyguard in 1925. Guido von List adapted Blavatsky's claims with his own occult visions of ancient Germanic tribes. He claimed the Armenians were once an élite class of priests dedicated to the god Wolan, whose duty had been to preserve occult knowledge. They had been forced into secrecy by Christian persecution, but their ideas had been kept alive by Rosicrucians, Freemasons and the Knights Templar.

The science of eugenics (known in Germany as 'racial hygiene') derived from Darwin's theories of survival of the fittest. Jorg Lanz linked Aryan occultism and eugenics in an occult religion of race called theo-zoology. He founded the Order of the New Templars (ONT) whose ultimate aim was an Aryan supremacy and purity of blood achieved through eugenic selection and the extermination or enslavement of racial inferiors. Such ideas were accepted by the Nazis, and the Schutzstaffel (SS) was to be the instrument through which they were carried out.

Heinrich Himmler concerns the use he made of the SS to realise his personal visions for the Aryo-Germanic millennium. Entry into the SS involved strict vetting of physical attributes and ancestry. The SS Race and Resettlement Bureau was set up initially to control SS breeding. It later became involved in the vetting of civilian marriages, and

the sterilisation of the disabled and the mentally ill. Concentration camps were set up partly to prevent racial inferiors from breeding. The Bureau organised the repatriation of those of Aryan stock in occupied countries. The *Einsatzgruppen* were responsible for the extermination of inferiors to provide lands for Aryan settlement.

Himmler invited occultist Karl Maria Wiligut, who claimed to possess psychic powers and to be the last of a line of priest-kings, to investigate the ancestry of the Aryan race. Himmler purchased Wewelsburg castle, associated with ancient Saxon king Heinrich I, to become a new SS spiritual centre. Himmler evidently believed himself to be a reincarnation of Heinrich, a conqueror of the Slavs, and believed prophecies, discovered by Wiligut at Wewelsburg, of a decisive victory over Asia.

Lastly, *Adolph Hitler* describes his heroic First World War exploits in a Bavarian regiment. His gift for oratory, and his first contact with the DAP as an army spy. He visited Jorg Lanz, and collected Lanz's publication *Ostara*. He was influenced by mystics such as the anti-Semitic English writer Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who believed the Teutonic race would dominate the world, and Karl Haushofer, whose theories of geopolitics predicted an expansion to the east as Germany's national destiny. Thule Society member Dietrich Eckhart encouraged Hitler's anti-Semitism and introduced him to influential circles. *Mein Kampf*, which Hitler began writing in 1924 while imprisoned after the failed Bavarian coup, reveals Hitler's visions for Germany: his virulent anti-Semitism lead to the Final Solution and the doctrine of *lebensraum* and the prophecy of Aryan victory over the

peoples from the east lead to the invasion of Russia. Ultimately he saw himself as the source of all power in a rigid hierarchy; a Messiah who would lead the nation to a glorious Thousand Year Reich.

Each of the four tapes is self-contained, but this has led to some duplication of content. The series is made up almost entirely of archive footage, much of it unfamiliar, and is narrated by actor Patrick Allen. The paucity of reliable source material necessitated considerable original research by writer-director Dave Flitton. He has treated the subject matter unsensationally, and has provided a worthwhile and illuminating introduction of considerable interest to a little-known subject.

The 11-volume *Encyclopedia of World War Two* consists of entries arranged alphabetically from Africa Corps to Marshal Zukhov. Subjects covered include battles, campaigns, weapons and personalities. Each one hour tape contains an average of 20 entries and is narrated by Patrick Allen. The format is hardly suitable for continuous viewing, and would be better served by the kind of random-access technology provided by laser-disks.

Lastly, the four volumes of *Air Power* are documentaries produced in 1988 by the McGraw-Hill publication *Aviation Week and Space Technology*. *SR-71 Blackbird* deals with the famous surveillance aircraft, *Flightdeck* deals with carrier-borne aircraft, *Air Superiority* compares American warplanes with their Russian counterparts, while *Test Pilot* deals with the history of test piloting. Each volume features in-flight footage and interviews with pilots.

All the above are only available by mail order; those interested should write to Time-Life Video, c/o Time-Life International, FREEPOST 15, London W1E 8WE, or phone 071-408-0868.

Stephen J. Greenhill

ON THE SCREEN

YOU CANNOT LOOK at any one of David Cartwright's paintings without being immediately drawn into the action. Even though his figures are more often suggested rather than delineated in detail, you can feel the heaving of their chests, smell the sweat of their exertion, excitement and fear, hear the crash of musketry and cannon and the hoarse shouts and screams of men locked in mortal combat.

His recent 'Day of Waterloo' exhibition in Birmingham's Halcyon Gallery attracted hundreds of visitors both from the fine art field and from those interested in military affairs, and nearly all the 36 paintings displayed have now been sold for prices up to £4,750. Lines of tiredness around their eyes from the effort of almost non-stop work involved in putting the exhibition together, David and his wife Sara smilingly greeted each guest. Now they could relax — until the next project.

Born in Birkenhead in 1944, David radiates the good humour typical of his home town, although since 1977 he has lived in an isolated house on Angelsry which gives him

*'Havoc and Destruction',
20x30in.*

CARTWRIGHT'S WATERLOO

BRUCE QUARRIE

A RECENT MAJOR exhibition of the work of David Cartwright in Birmingham's Halcyon Gallery prompted this report from our editor, himself a painter in oils although mostly of seascapes and landscapes. He sees Cartwright — whose career almost tragically came to an end ten years ago — as the modern equivalent of Lady Butler, and his Waterloo Collection as one of the most significant for many years.

the peace and lack of distraction he needs for the almost frenzied pace at which he works. The son of an army officer who won the Military Cross in 1944, David always wanted to be an artist and studied at the Birkenhead Laird School of Art and Liverpool College of Art before becoming a teacher. Although he found this career rewarding, it did not leave him enough time for what he really wanted to do, so in the early 1970s he resigned to take up oil painting full time.

By the early 1980s he was gaining recognition as a military artist to watch, with paintings exhibited in places as far

apart as Harrods and Frankfurt. Then tragedy struck. In 1982 David came down with a severe muscular disease which, for a while, looked as though it would prevent him ever painting again. (Coincidentally, it was in the same year that I fractured my spine and for a time thought I might never be able to write again.) But, with the help of his wife Sara, he pulled through and in 1987 was able to begin painting once more. Since then, his scenes of Napoleonic and Crimean warfare have found homes in places as diverse as the National Army Museum, the Royal Military



David Cartwright at work in his studio.

Academy, Sandhurst, the United Nations in Geneva and Shell headquarters in Texas.

Although his style is impressionistic, David researches each of his subjects thoroughly before touching paint to canvas. Osprey's 'Men-at-Arms' books, as well as those formerly published by Blandford, are consulted regularly — as is, we are delighted to learn, 'M'. Gradually, he builds up in his mind's eye a picture of the scene he wishes to depict, and follows through with more detailed research where necessary. In conceiving his 'Day of Waterloo' collection, he found Derek Saunders' Waterloo Museum in Broadstairs, Kent, an invaluable place in which to study, as well as the National





'Attack on the Allied Ridge', 16x30in.

Army Museum. Members of re-enactment societies have also helped in getting not just uniform details correct, but in suggesting poses and demonstrating the way weapons were used. The museums and societies of regiments present at Waterloo were of further help.

Every artist develops his own

'Tom, Tom, Here Comes the Cavalry!', 20x30in.

individual style and technique, and over the years I have been privileged to watch several at work, including the renowned maritime and aviation artist Roy Cross — who first established his reputation painting box-tops for Airfix kits in the 1960s — and Michael Turner. In all three cases, it is the meticulous research which makes their paintings stand out head and shoulders, even though the styles, techniques and materials are totally different. (The same can, of course, be said of

several other artists whose work has appeared in 'MI' — space prevents mentioning them all by name, but you know who I mean. But, by and large, here we are talking about a rather different art form, as I am sure they would agree.)

Personally, I couldn't work the same way as David, although like him I use a palette knife because — especially in a seascape — I think the thick richness of the texture and the way colours spring out give a more dramatic effect. But

David uses the 'wet' technique, working almost non-stop at a canvas over a period of up to five days, rather than letting successive layers dry over a period of weeks. And it is undoubtedly this technique which gives his paintings their vibrancy and immediacy.

Once David has completed his research, he sketches his scene straight on to canvas using a brush and thinned oils. Then the palette knives come out and the colours and textures begin to leap out at you,





building up in layers so that the ridges from the cannon wheel tracks or the mud flying from thundering hooves are accentuated. He barely pauses for coffee, food or sleep while working, and will not let his wife look at a new painting until he feels he has got it almost right. If he is not satisfied with the way a painting is progressing after a couple of days, he will scrape the canvas clean and start again. Then, after four or five days, he will let Sara view the painting, and

ing that her fresh eye can often suggest a slight change of composition or emphasis. She also 'stretches' him by sometimes insisting on the inclusion of greater detail, or a more clearly defined expression on a figure's face. These touches are added with a fine 00 brush when the main composition is complete.

When he is working, David is totally caught up in his subject, almost literally pouring his thoughts on to canvas to create atmosphere. He does not con-

cern himself with hard edges and exact detail, but strives to reach out and affect his audience emotionally. The success of his exhibition shows that his method works, his bold use of colour and light combining with a natural eye for perspective to create one memorable scene after another. His horses are as remarkable as his men, so perfectly proportioned and full of life that you can see their heaving chests and feel the hot breath whistling out of their nostrils.

*'Attack Hougoumont!',
16x30in.*

A valid compliment came from a former Marine veteran who visited the Birmingham exhibition and commented on the power and reality of the explosions. The artist is striving to make his audience feel they are actually involved in the swifling drama of the action in the same way that Lady Butler

*'The Pride of Napoleon',
20x30in.*



BOOK REVIEWS



'Fire and Gunsmoke at Haugomont', 30x20in.

achiever, although Turner is another obvious influence. David sums his attitude up succinctly: 'The criteria for a successful painting must be that the scene has to grip the viewer and excite him. If it does not, then the painting will not be seen at all.'



'I want you to taste the gun smoke and feel the adrenalin pulsate. I want you to hear the cries of confusion with the mud flying, cannons blazing and horses rearing amidst streams of smoke.'

More power to your palette knife, David Cartwright. **M**

'Infantryman of the 28th Foot', 22x16in.

Lions of England: A Pictorial history of the King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster), 1680-1980 by Stuart Eastwood. Silver Link Publishing; ISBN 0-947971-68-8; 192pp., ill throughout; appendices, index & bibliography; £30.00.

This is a remarkably fine regimental history which will appeal to all students of the British Army over the last 300 years. The text is short by design, and those wishing deeper knowledge should consult Colonels L.I. and J.M. Cowper's definitive three-volume history. Where this new volume will score as far as 'M' readers are concerned is in the absorbing illustration content — page after page of finely reproduced photographs, prints and engravings printed on high quality art paper illustrating the regiment's uniforms, personalities and equipment from the time it was first raised for the defence of Tangier through to the post-1945 disbandments and amalgamations.

The book has been compiled by the Keeper of Military History at Lancaster City Museum, whose detailed knowledge and enthusiasm for his subject leaps from every page. Additionally, this means that the majority of photographs will be now to practically every reader, something rarely encountered these days.

Lions of England is not a cheap book but since the Lancasters have served in practically every theatre of every war Britain has been involved in since the time of Charles II, there really is something for everyone. One photograph particularly caught this reviewer's attention: a line-up of Iraqi prisoners-of-war taken after the battle of Habbaniya in 1941... Plus ça change!

Ten Years On: The British Army in the Falklands War edited by Linda Washington. National Army Museum Publications; ISBN 0-901721-24-7; 112pp; colour and mono plates, maps, glossary & index; £14.00.

Many people will probably buy this book just for Major-General Michael Rose's chapter on SAS operations in the Falklands, although even he has obviously had the Official Secrets Act stapled to his typewriter... Joking apart, coming with the authority of a National Army Museum publication, and with contributors such as Brigadier Hew Pike on infantry and armoured reconnaissance forces and Major-General Brian Pennicott on the Gunners, this slim though large-format paperback is rewarding reading. One only wishes that Brigadier Julian Thompson would stick to soldiering and leave writing to others; his chapter on 'The Land Battle' is both facile and gives himself perhaps more credit for successes (and explanations for fail-

ures) than a more unbiased observer would have contrived.

This criticism aside, this is a well-conceived book with several other distinguished contributors which treats the Falklands' campaign as a series of problems rather than simply trying to narrate events in chronological order. The maps in particular are superb and one would like to say 'thank you' to the artist, but his or her name does not appear to feature in the credits.

Grandad's War: The Personal Diary of an O.R. 1942-1943 compiled by J.M. Clayton. 168pp, b/w photos and maps, paperback. Available from J.M. Clayton, 8 Castle Road, Portland, Dorset DT5 1AU. £5.95 & 65p p&p.

Written by a retired headmistress, this absorbing book is based upon the diary her grandfather — an anti-aircraft gunner — kept while stationed in North Africa from the time of Alamein to the fall of Tripoli. The diary has been supplemented by considerable extra research and rewritten into a cohesive narrative which gives a good portrait of the 'Other Ranks' war and the usual obsession with subjects such as food and the weather.

The Willoughbys by Toby Giese. 72pp, b/w illu., paperback. \$12 & \$3 p&p. **Napoleon's Traitor** by Toby Giese. 76pp, b/w illu., paperback. \$18 & \$3.50 p&p. Both available from the author, POB 37095, Long View Station, Kansas City, Mo 64134, USA.

Was Marshal Ney really executed on 7 December 1815 or was the firing squad 'rigged'? Was the Duke of Wellington party to a conspiracy to whisk the 'bravest of the brave' away to a new life in America? Author Toby Giese believes he was smuggled aboard a ship and lived out the remainder of his natural life in North Carolina, finally dying in 1846. You'll have to read *Napoleon's Traitor* before you can decide for yourself.

The same author's second book is aimed at children. In the story, young Will Willoughby's grandfather tells him about his ancestors who fought at Waterloo, in the Charge of the Light Brigade, in the Zulu and Boer Wars and in the trenches of the First World War. Young Will Willoughby then takes up the tale himself with his Second World War experiences — rather strange ones too: he joined the Special Air Service, flew aerial photographic reconnaissance stories prior to D-Day, then jumped with the 6th Airborne Division and ended up getting wounded at Arnhem. Hmmmm... While one must applaud any attempt to get children interested in history through telling a story, the facts have got to be right. **RB**

WIN A NORMANDY TOUR!



Yes — a holiday for two with Major and Mrs Holt's Battlefield Tours Ltd is the first great prize in our autumn reader's competition. The lucky winner and a friend of choice will spend four days in Normandy touring the Allied invasion beaches — Juno, Sword, Gold, Omaha and Utah — as well as visiting Pegasus Bridge and Ste Mère Eglise, scenes of the British and American airborne landings. They will travel by luxury coach and stay at an hotel in Caen, the town where the German defenders held Montgomery up for so long. Breakfast and dinner with wine are included in the prize, and the tour also includes an excursion to Bayeux. It's an opportunity not to be missed as Holt's Tours have become world-renowned in their 16 years of successful operation, so start collecting the entry coupons in this and the subsequent two issues of 'MI'.

The two runners-up will each receive a personally autographed copy of Sir Peter de Billière's book, *Storm Command: A personal account of the Gulf War*, published by HarperCollins in September. There will also be five third prizes of free one-year subscriptions to *Military Illustrated*.

How to enter:

In this issue, and those for October ('MI' No 53) and November ('MI' No 54), we print three sets of quiz questions. All can be answered by anyone with a reasonable knowledge of military history and access to a moderate library; there are no trick questions.

Cut out or photostat the entry coupon from all three issues; complete them in BFOCK CAPITALS please; and post them to the address on the coupon. Entries must arrive not later than 1 December 1992; overseas competitors should use airmail postage. NB: KEEP THE FIRST TWO COUPONS UNTIL THE THIRD IS PUBLISHED, AND SUBMIT THEM ALL TOGETHER.

The rules

The competition is open to all readers EXCEPT employees of Military Illustrated Ltd and their immediate relatives. Only entries arriving at our offices on or before 1 December 1992 will be valid. In all matters connected with the validity or correctness of entries the Editor's decision will be final. The prizes will be awarded to eight readers submitting all-correct entries, the order to be determined by a 'tiebreaker' question which will be published with part three of the competition. The correct answers, and winners, will be published in 'MI' No 57, February 1993.

ENTRY COUPON (A): Send with coupons (B) and (C) to: 'Competition, Military Illustrated Ltd, 43 Museum St, London WC1A 1LY'.

(A1) Who was the German commander during the siege of Brest in 1944?
.....

(A2) Who is the highest-scoring fighter pilot ace of all time?
.....

(A3) The Shenandoah campaign in 1862 culminated in which battle?
.....

(A4) Which battleship exploded and sank in Havana harbour in 1898 with the loss of 260 lives?
.....

(A5) 'The Black Day' was the name given by General Erich von Ludendorff to which date during the First World War?
.....

(A6) Who commanded the Army of the Elbe in 1866?
.....

(A7) From which town is the word 'bayonet' derived?
.....

(A8) Who became Professor of Military History at St Cyr in 1921?
.....

Competitor's details:

Name

Address

Post Code Country



The Spanish introduced the musket to the Low Countries where it was adopted by the Dutch and their English allies. Detail showing Spanish arquebusiers and musketeers circa 1577. Note the musket rests and bandoliers of the musketeers and the priming flasks carried by the arquebusiers. (K.A.B Roberts Collection.)

THE MATCHLOCK MUSKET

KEITH ROBERTS and JOHN TINCEY

CONTINUING OUR series of articles on the English Civil Wars 1642-1651, we look at the weapon which dominated the 17th century battlefield, the musketeer's equipment and the development of tactics.

ASK THE NAME of the classic weapon of the English soldier and you will probably find the 'Brown Bess' musket, the Lee-Enfield rifle, and the longbow at the top of the list. One weapon that you are unlikely to find highly placed is the Matchlock musket despite the fact that from the 1590s to the 1700s it formed the principal missile weapon of English as well as all Western European armies.

EARLY HISTORY

Hand-held firearms had been used in Western Europe since the early 14th century but as they were fired by placing the butt against the chest and touching off the priming powder with a hand-held piece of burning match cord, they were highly inaccurate. The development of the 'Matchlock' around 1471 enabled soldiers to adopt a more effective firing stance which allowed the weapon to be aimed at its target.

This weapon was used with devastating effect by the Spanish armies during the

Italian Wars to defeat both Swiss pike blocks (at Bicocca in 1522) and French *Gens d'armes* (at Pavia in 1525). Although the arquebus proved to be an effective weapon when used by commanders who appreciated its worth, it lacked the power to penetrate heavy armour. The musket, which could fire a heavier ball, was able to kill an armoured man or stop a charging horse at 100 yd. Sir James Turner in his work *Pallas Armata* (London, 1683) commented that the musket was thought to have been first used at the siege of Rhegium in 1520 but, 'if it be so... it hath spent forty years of its age before it learned to speak, for about the year 1560, some Muskets were mixed with Harquebusses, and but a few of them too'. Some muskets were certainly in use in 1530 as soldiers carrying forked rests with their firearms are illustrated amongst those escorting the German Emperor Charles V and the weapon is mentioned in the Book *Ballestas, Mosquetes y Arcabuces* (Naples, 1537). Its

introduction was gradual as in addition to its greater killing power it also had greater weight, 18 lb or more as compared to 10 lb for an arquebus, and took a strong man to carry and use.

The advantages of the musket for field service and siege warfare were considerable, and the Duke of Alba is said to have introduced 25 musketeers in each of the infantry companies serving in the Spanish Army in Flanders. English soldiers probably first encountered the musket while serving as allies or mercenaries of the Dutch during their war of independence against the Spanish.

EQUIPMENT

The efficient operation of a matchlock arquebus or musket required the use of a number of other pieces of equipment to fire and maintain it. These were a small powder flask containing priming powder; another flask, cartridges or a bandolier of charges containing the coarser powder used in its main charge; a pouch to hold

musket balls; a set of tools to clean and repair the musket and for the heavier musket a forked 'musket rest' to support its weight when it was aimed and fired.

Two different grades of gunpowder were used, fine 'tutch powder' for the priming pan, carried in a small priming flask, and coarser 'cone powder' for the main charge. This main charge could be carried in a number of ways. The earliest was in a larger powder flask, usually fitted with a long nozzle or pipe which held the correct amount of powder for one full charge. The soldier would turn the flask upside down with his finger over the open end of the pipe so that the pipe would fill with powder. A spring catch at the base of the nozzle would then be closed to isolate the powder in the pipe.

Of this type of equipment William Garrard, an Englishman who had served in the Spanish Army, wrote in his *The Arte of warre* (written circa 1587 and published in 1591, edited by Captain Robert Hichcock): 'A souldier ought to be careful that his furniture be good, substantiall and sturche from raine, the charge for hys flaske just for hys peece, and the spring quicke and sharpe; the pipe of his tutchboxe somewhat wyde, that the powder may have free passage,

which otherwise would choke up.'

This method was superseded by the use of a bandolier, a leather belt with a number of metal or wooden containers (each holding enough gunpowder for a single shot) suspended from it. The normal number of containers, also called boxes or charges, attached to the bandolier was 12, reflecting the number of bullets made from a pound of


lead for a standard musket. However, large batches of bandoliers with 15 boxes were ordered for the Irish expedition of 1641 and others with eight or ten are known. These variations are indicators of the number of different musket bores in use as the number of containers still reflect the number of bullets moulded from a pound of lead. Larger numbers of containers probably indicate the use of lighter 'bastard' muskets

with smaller bores while the smaller numbers would be for the very heavy large bore muskets which became obsolete in the 1590s.

By the 17th century the bandolier had become the standard method of carrying powder, its popularity probably due to the fact that it gave a more certain charge than the flask. The bandolier had its disadvantages and Gairard's comment on mistakenly loading an empty

'charge' will ring true to any re-enactment musketeer:

'And I would wish that they should charge their musquets with powder out of the pipes or chaiges of the flasks as the harquebuziers aforesaid, and not out of charges that hang upon hand rolles as many doo use: Because that oftentimes the covers of such charges doo flie off, and shed the powder, in such sort as the musquetiers if they be not olde souldiors or wel




Above and below:

Examples of musket patterns: Those below have a sear lock rather than a trigger to bring the vice and notch curl down to the printing pan. Those above show styles more commonly used during the English Civil War.

Right:

Bandoliers: Examples of different patterns of the containers hung from a bandolier, each containing sufficient coarse powder for a single shot. The upper bandolier is an unusual example with a leather flap to protect the containers from the weather, possibly designed for Militia rather than a regular soldier. (Artist: Neil Wright.)





This magnificent set of early 17th century cuirassier's armour (see also 'M51') demonstrates the armourer's last major attempt to provide protection against firearms used on the battlefield. The dent on the right side of the breast-plate is where a test pistol shot has failed to penetrate, 'proving' the armour to be pistol proof. (Wallace Collection, London.)


practised, doo sometimes thinke that they charge their peeeces out of such bandrol charges, when the powder was split before, so as sometimes they put in their bullets into their peeeces without any powder.'

Another alternative was to carry powder in paper cartridges, each filled with sufficient gunpowder for a single charge. These were used by infantrymen when supplies of bandoliers were scarce but were gradually regarded as a poor substitute. Sir John Smythe, writing in 1591, cautioned that the motion of a horse was likely to shake a paper cartridge open so that the gunpowder would be lost. It is not difficult to appreciate that the motion of a trotting horse would have made a bandolier with 12 separate containers hanging from strings

decidedly uncomfortable. Cavalry and dragoons therefore opted to use a flask or cartridges despite the difficulties in ensuring a fully measured charge suffered by both.

Apart from this principal equipment, a soldier also carried three important pieces of equipment for the maintenance of his arquebus or musket. There were the priming pin, a sower and a worm. Firing a musket produced a residue of uncombusted powder and ash which could easily block the 'touch-hole' which led from the priming pan to the main charge in the barrel. This would prevent the sparks from the ignition of the priming pan reaching the main charge and produce a 'flash in the pan' without firing the weapon. Garrard described the 'proynning pinnies' which were pushed into the touch hole to clear the obstruction:

Detail of New Model Infantry from Joshua Sprigge's Anglia Rediviva (1647). Note the 'Forlorn Hope' of musketeers in advance and the placement of artillery. The artist has used some licence in the spacing of the front line infantry regiments as the gap should be equal to the width of the covering second line unit. (K.A.B Roberts Collection.)



This munition quality
matchlock musket of the
English Civil War period

shows the detail which went
into military weapons of the
time. The finely formed trigger
and its guard are shaped to
accommodate the fingers
while the thumb fits snugly
into the carefully angled dip in
the stock above. The serpent,
here without its match cord, is
decorated with a small eye to
make it more conspicuous.
(Royal Armouries, HM Tower of
London.)

This leather pouch and flask
may be of military or civilian
origin, but represents the basic
design elements of the
cartridge holder. Separate
tubes are provided for each
cartridge with a flap to protect
the paper and gunpowder
from the weather. Some
cartridge boxes were made
from tin and covered in
leather with a wooden former
drilled with holes to take
individual cartridges. Drill
books of the 1680s
demonstrate that cartridge
boxes still carried a separate
priming flask with fine 'touch'
gunpowder similar to that
shown here. (Royal

Armouries, HM Tower of
London.)

'Let a snailier have hanging
over at the strynges of hys lutch
boxe, or some other ready part
of his garment a couple of
playning pinnes at the least,
that hee may therewith both
make his pan cleane, and yeeld
a ready passage that the fire
may have her course by innu-
perating both the touch powder
withinn, and the course powder
withinn together.'

The other tools, scowler and
worm, were attachments
which could be fitted by a
screw thread in a metal tip set
at the opposite end of a rammer
in its inner ramming head. The
scowler was a wire brush
which was used to remove the
powder residue which clogged a
barrel and the rust which
would form if a soldier failed to
oil his barrel. The worm,
shaped like a corkscrew, was
used to remove a misfired
charge and its wadding.

The musket was a heavy
weapon with early models
weighing up to twenty pounds
and a musketeer required a
forked musket rest to aim and
fire it. Garrard gave a good
description when he wrote:
'The musket is to be used in all
respects lyke unto the har-
gahse, save that in respect
hee carryes a double bullet
(ie, twice as large), and is
more weighty. He useth a
staffe breast high, in the one
end a pyke to pitch in the
ground, and in the other an
iron forke to rest hys peece
uppon, and a hoale a little
beneath the same in the staffe:
whereunto he doth adde a
string, which tyed and
wrapped about hys wrist,

yeelds hym commoditie to
traile hys forke or staffe after
hym whilst he in skymish
doth charge hys musket a fresh
with powder and bullet.'

By the early 1630s a lighter
pattern musket was developed
which could be fired without a
musket rest. During the English
Civil War many musketeers
had to make do with old fash-
ioned heavier muskets and the
musket rest remained in use
during the early years of the
war.

THE EVOLUTION OF TACTICS

Early Spanish successes in Italy
had relied upon the combina-
tion of arquebus firepower and
field fortification or broken
ground. The next stage was to
develop tactical styles which
allowed its use in the open
field and here the Spanish
expanded existing ideas of the
combination of firearms and
pikemen to create their new
Tercio formations. The objec-
tive was to combine the advan-
tages of both weapons, as
arquebusiers alone could not
survive long in the open if they
were attacked by cavalry. A
formed body of pikemen, on
the other hand, could defend

Detail of Dutch 'shot' at the
capture of Isselort in 1588. In
the confused fighting of siege
warfare there was little
attempt to keep soldiers
together in specific weapon
groups. Here a lone musketeer
(with musket rest) supports
lightly armed arquebusiers
who are able to run into
action. (K.A.B. Roberts
Collection.)

themselves quite adequately
against cavalry armed with
lances or swords but had no
defence against pistols. By
combining both arms the pike-
men provided a physical bar-
rier against cavalry attack while
the arquebusiers' weapons
had a greater range than caval-
ry pistols.

Different tactics were
required in opposing enemy

infantry as the key requirement
was the ability to fire as many
shots as possible while the dis-
tance between formations
decreased. Heavy casualties
amongst enemy pikemen gave
their opponents a better
chance in the hand-to-hand
combat — the 'push of pike' —
which followed an advance.
Spanish and Italian officers in
the multi-national Spanish




army conducted a number of experiments in an attempt to make the best use of their firepower and developed a variety of effective tactics and formations. However, they suffered from the depth of their infantry formations which were at least 20 deep and could be deeper. This wasted firepower since it was impossible to bring all their arquebusers into action quickly, but did not offer a serious disadvantage while their opponents used similar formations.

A new opportunity was realised by the Dutch as they decreased the depth of their infantry to ten. By using a system whereby each of the ten ranks fired in succession then retired to the rear of the body to re-load, the Dutch could achieve continuous fire. By the time the tenth rank had fired the first had re-loaded and was ready to fire again. The Spanish were capable of operating a similar system but with deeper formations so a meeting between an equal number of Dutch and Spanish 'shot' would result in the Dutch bringing more men into the firing line in a shorter period. With this as an example, military theorists in Germany experimented with the idea of reducing the depth still further to eight or even six deep, a concept adopted by the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus who settled on six.

The Swedish still practised volley firing by successive ranks but also introduced an additional system by which all their available 'shot' could be fired in one or two great 'Salvees'. They achieved this by developing a style of firing which allowed three ranks to fire together, the first rank kneeling, the second stooping and the third standing. Either the first three ranks fired and then the last three marched forward and fired in turn or six ranks were merged into three and all fired together.

The value of these 'salvees' was the massive effect of concentrated firepower and it was used either immediately before the pikemen met or in defence against cavalry. In either case it was considered a desperate measure as the 'shot', all musketeers by now, would not have time to re-load and, as Sir James Turner commented, 'firing by three ranks at a time, should not be practised, but when the business seems to be desperate, or that the Bodies are so near, that the Pikemen are almost come to push of Pike, and then no other



Detail from the Militia training manual *Directions for Masters* (1638) showing four of the postures involved in musketeer training. (R.A.B. Roberts Collection.)

use can be made of the Musquet but the Butt-end of it'.

Englishmen used the Dutch system as their model, a natural connection as the English mercenary regiments in Dutch service retained strong links with the English government, assisting in the training of the English Militia and providing experienced officers for the disastrous English campaigns during the 1620s. At the outbreak of war in 1642, Parliamentary infantry retained the pre-war depth of eight deep while their Royalist opponents, under the influence of the King's nephew Prince Rupert, followed the Swedish system with a reduction in depth to six men. By 1644 both sides fought six deep and both mixed firing by ranks with the use of 'Salvees'.

ACCURACY AND RATE OF FIRE

Although the introduction of the matchlock improved accuracy by allowing soldiers to fire from the shoulder and aim their shot, calivers and muskets were notoriously inaccurate

weapons. However, the intention was to fire volleys of shot from groups of infantry at large opposing formations, not individuals, and the musket was good enough for this.

There was considerable debate in England during the 1590s over the comparative value of arquebuses and muskets over longbows. Advocates of both sides made exaggerated claims about the effect of their favoured weapon while dismissing those of their opponents. Humphrey Barwick, putting forward the view of the pre-shot lobby in 1591, classified the effect: 'it will kill the armed of proofe at ten-score yairdes [200yd], the common armours at twenty score [400yd] and the unarmed at thirty score [600yd] being well used in bullet and tried powder'. Sir John Smythe, to whom Barwick was responding, had written in his *Certain Discourses* (London 1590) that 'the Mosquet reinforced and well charged with good powder, would carrie a full bullet poynt and blanke 24 or 30 scores [ie, up to 600yd], but considered that even when fired at 'twelve scores [240yd] at either horsemen or footmen that are in motion, they shall work no great annoyance, by reason that the bullets... doe naturallie mount and flie uncerteinlie'. Smythe quoted

the practice of the veteran infantry of the Spanish Army of Flanders who might commence firing at 200yd but only a few men would fire with the intention of fooling their opponents into firing back at the same range, wasting their powder and shot and furling their weapons. The real volleys they would hold back until 20yd.

Recent experiments at the Landeszeughaus at Graz in Austria (See 'M133') show a musket ball fired from a 17th century musket will carry about a thousand yards so the effective ranges and penetration given by Barwick were probably true in optimum conditions. Smythe's comments were probably true for the actual practice of his time, the 1590s. By the time of the Civil War the practice had changed somewhat with the introduction of better systems for continuous volleys rank by rank. Firing by a few men to 'amuse' the enemy might still begin at 200yd but firing in earnest would begin at 100 to 120yd. Officers using the 'Salvee' had to save its effect since they had only one opportunity to use it and could delay until their opponents were as close as ten yards away. As for the rate of fire, recent experiments by the authors and Neal Gray have shown that a competent, trained musketeer could load and fire his musket in 30 seconds, less if he used some of the shortcuts practised at the time. Further experiments are planned by Keith Roberts and John Litchfield to assess the rate of fire of soldiers firing volleys by successive ranks.

The value of the matchlock musket has been disregarded in recent years by writers who have been misled by their inability to understand the contemporary manuals which describe its practical use. The most common error is the assumption that the detailed orders used in training were also given in the field, unrealistically increasing the estimate of time required to load a musket. Although flint ignition was used in the 16th and 17th centuries, most contemporary soldiers saw its value in specialist activities such as guarding gunpowder supplies or for mounted troops, where lighted match had obvious disadvantages. The continued use of the matchlock at the turn of the 18th century was an indication that its simple design, speed of loading and consistent killing power made it a robust and effective weapon. **M1**

'FIGHTERS, NOT SOLDIERS'

12th SS-Panzer Division 'Hitler Jugend'



Badge as applied to 'Hitler Jugend' vehicles, normally without the shield, in white or yellow. (Drawing by D.S.V. Foster.)

ANDREW STEVEN

THE IDEA FOR a hand-picked division plucked from the flower of German youth — the Hitlerjugend organisation which gave the division its name — originated with Artur Axmann, the Hitler Youth leader, in January 1943. Gottlob Berger, responsible for so much recruitment into the Waffen-SS, was so entranced by the scheme that he asked to be appointed the unit's commander. Fortunately, in a rare rational moment, Himmler prevailed, telling Berger that he was far too valuable where he was to be wasted in the field, and instead picked the veteran Leibstandarte regimental commander, Standartenführer (later Brigadeführer) Fritz Witt.

Divisional headquarters were established at Beverloo, in Belgium, and by the middle of the year the first 10,000 volunteers were under intensive training.

When questioned in February by Hitler about the new SS formation, Himmler proudly told him that the average age was only 18. This delighted the Führer. German youth, he said, fights 'magnificently and with incredible bravery... the youngsters who come from the Hitler Youth are fanatical fighters... these young German lads, some only 16 years old... fight more fanatically than their older comrades.'

The division was officially called into being on 24 June 1943 and, after training, was posted to France in April 1944; at the time of D-Day it was barracksed just south of Paris and was thus in an almost ideal position to take part in the counter-offensive as part of 'Sepp' Dietrich's I SS Panzer Korps alongside Theodor Wisch's Leibstandarte 'Adolf Hitler' and 101 schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung (in which Michael Wittmann was a company commander — see 'MI'

THE 17 AND 18-year-olds of the 12th SS-Panzer Division 'Hitler Jugend' were 'taught to be fighters, not soldiers'. They employed teenage tactics; dressed outlandishly in 'leathers'; and painted their girlfriends' names shamelessly all over their tanks. But they fought with fanatical courage and passion, and introduced a deep rivalry between themselves and the veterans of the Leibstandarte 'Adolf Hitler' by using the former's key symbol crossed with a runic 'S' as their unit symbol.

48 and letters page in this issue). The division began arriving around Lisieux in the afternoon of 6 June 1944, but was subsequently moved to the west of Caen on the 7th, alongside the army's 21st Panzer Division.

Here, the teenagers faced the Canadian 3rd Division, but they were unable to bring their full strength to bear because half of their tanks had been stranded north of the river Orne en route due to lack of fuel. Kurt 'Panzer' Meyer, commander of the division's Panzer regiment, put what tanks there were alongside their supporting infantry in concealed positions behind a low ridge. Employing Wellingtonian tactics, he ordered them to hold their fire until the last moment — which they did, only opening up when the charging Canucks were a mere hundred yards away.

The 'Hitler Jugend' was unsuccessful in pushing the Canadians back into the sea off 'Juno' beach as intended, but did succeed in denying them Caen's Le Cauriquet airfield — which Montgomery badly needed. A measure of their fighting acumen is that they had knocked out 28 Canadian tanks but only lost two of their own destroyed, four damaged, and 200 men in this fierce engagement. Next day, 8 June, the division's second (Panther) tank battalion finally arrived and the 'Hitler Jugend' went over to the offensive, heading generally towards Bayeux with the Panzer Lehr Division on their left. Due to the intensity of Allied aerial attacks during daylight hours, this counter-offensive rapidly bogged down, and Fritz Bayerlein's Panzer Lehr was forced to withdraw when threatened by an outflanking

manoeuvre by the 7th Armoured Division. (It was Michael Wittmann's engagement at Villers Bocage which saved them from encirclement and a grateful Bayerlein who recommended Wittmann for the Swords to go with his Knights Cross with Oakleaves.)

'Hitler Jugend' continued to defend Le Cauriquet with vigour, but losses were mounting and the whole division was shocked and saddened by the death of Fritz Witt himself during a naval bombardment on 16 June. 'Panzer' Meyer took over immediately; he was an equally popular figure, tough, determined and imaginative, and rapidly restored his youngsters' flagging morale. Just in time, for on 26 June Montgomery launched Operation 'Epsom', which so alarmed I SS Panzer Korps commander 'Sepp' Dietrich that he demanded that Rommel release Brigadeführer Wilhelm Bittrich's II SS Panzer Korps (9th SS-Panzer Division 'Hohenstaufen', 10th SS-Panzer Division 'Frundsberg' and 102 schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung) to help in repulsing the attack.

Young member of the 'Hitler Jugend' Division in the drill pea green M43 camouflage tunic. Over his shoulders, supporting his waistbelt, is a pair of 'Y' straps (Koppelttraggestell). The helmet is in plain anodised finish without decals. The rifle is the 1938 Kar 98 without the later sight hood on the muzzle.





Snipers were a response to the experience of the Eastern Front, where the Russians skillfully used lone troops armed with telescopic-sighted rifles to inflict limited but very effective casualties, taking a particular toll of senior NCOs and officers. The lessons learned were used to great effect against Allied forces in Normandy. This man has a Grw 98k adapted to sniper use with a ZF 41 scope. This was a 1.5-power unit with a base assembly giving front line troops who showed particular aptitude greater effective range. On his waistbelt is a carrying case for the 'scope when not in use.

The Allies finally succeeded in capturing Le Carpiquet airfield despite the fierce resistance of 'Hitler Jugend', and by 8 July most of Caen was also in their hands following a massive aerial bombardment which had reduced the town to rubble. By this time, too, the 'Hitler Jugend' Division had lost over 60 per cent of its strength, killed, wounded or missing, and only had a third of its 150 tanks still operational. On the 11th it was withdrawn from the line and sent to Falaise.

The stage was now set for almost the last act in the Normandy drama. On 18 July — the same day the Americans captured St Lô — Montgomery launched Operation 'Goodwood'. The defenders were already shaken by the loss of Rommel, badly injured during an Allied fighter attack the previous day; and two days later the whole fabric of Nazi Germany would be rocked when Claus von Stauffenberg planted his bomb under the Führer's table.

For 'Goodwood', Montgomery used the Guards, 7th and 11th Armoured Divisions. They were opposed by the 'Hitler Jugend', Leibstandarte 'Adolf Hitler' and the 21st Panzer Division, all severely weakened in the previous month's fighting. (German casualties in Normandy up to this point totalled 97,000 while replacements only amounted to 6,000; similarly, 225 tanks had been destroyed and only 17 new ones delivered.)

While fighting still raged on the outskirts of Caen, the American General Omar Bradley was preparing his own breakout, originally timed for the 19th but delayed by bad weather until the 25th. Nevertheless, by the 30th the Americans had cleared Avranches and were fanning out into both Brittany and Normandy. They, and Montgomery's Anglo-Canadians, were opposed on paper by two German armies, Panzer Group West, now retitled Fifth Panzer Army and commanded by 'Sepp' Dietrich; and Seventh Army, commanded by SS-Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser since the death from a heart attack of General Friedrich Dollmann. These appointments reflected the ever-growing confidence which Hitler placed in the Waffen-SS after the army's 'perfidy' on 20 July.

The rest of the story is well known. The remnants of the German divisions were gradually encircled despite an attempt at a counter-attack through Mortain on 8 August. Hitler had ordered a 'mass' Panzer attack, but all that the overall German commander, Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, could 'mass' was 185 tanks from four divisions. The counter-attack was thus doomed to failure before it began. On the previous day, 'Hitler Jugend' had fought an incredible battle of their own. Reduced to only 50 tanks, they held off twelve times their own

number for 24 hours before retiring. On another occasion, 60 men from the division held out in farm buildings for three days before surrendering when the last four survivors finally ran out of ammunition. But such heroism was ultimately futile, for the end was clearly in sight.

Squeezed by the British Second and Canadian First Armies in the east and the American First and Third Armies in the west, the remnants of the proud Waffen-SS and army Panzer divisions found themselves trapped in a steadily shrinking pocket while rocket-firing fighter-bombers further decimated their ranks. The only exit from the trap was a rapidly shrinking 'neck' some 24 miles wide between Falaise and Argentan, and it was 'Hitler Jugend's' fate to hold this open for as long as possible to allow as many as possible of the 100,000 men in the pocket to escape.

They held out until 21 August, when the jaws of the trap finally snapped shut. Some 60,000 men entered captivity, but 'Hitler Jugend' had held them open for long enough for 40,000 to escape. The price was high. The division had arrived in Normandy with 21,300 men and 150 tanks; it left with a mere 300 men and ten tanks. *Sic transit gloria mundi.* **M**

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Ulrich of England and Peter Anodio for their help in the preparation of this article.

Key to colour photos opposite:
Top left: Panzer crew officer in special tanker's overalls.

Although made in reversible material, this is not strictly speaking reversible. There are only pockets on one side and the large integral inside pockets at the waist cannot be pulled through as one would expect with a truly reversible uniform. The chest pockets are fixed by press studs while the hip ones are held closed by Zeltbahn buttons. On his head is a well battered old style field cap (Feldmütze aller Art a/A).

Top right: A fully camouflaged grenadier in full field order. On his webbed 'A' frame


(Gefechtsgepack für Inf Schutzkompanien) is a battle pack (Beutel zum Gefechtsgepack) sitting above his Hitler Jugend Zeltbahn in field grey colour. Above the mess tin is a blanket secured to the frame by three leather greatcoat straps.

Suspended from his waistbelt by a large Type 1 frog is a folding shovel (Klappspaten). Behind this, attached to a leather hump, is a fitting to hold the bayonet firmly to the shovel. Above the circular M30/38 gasmask container is a gas cape pouch (Gasplane) attached to the shoulder sling using the improved method for wearing the pouch introduced on 11 December 1942. The helmet is in 'Normandy Finish' with green paint oversprayed on the basic sandy finish. He is carrying a G43 semi-automatic rifle normally carried by NCOs.

Bottom left: An SS-Schutze sitting drinking from a canteen (Eldflasche 31 and Trinkbecher). This oval bottle was kidney-shaped in cross-section, made of aluminium and held 0.8 litre. Wartime variants in 'bule bottles made of steel; grey or olive coloured felt covering; plastic-impregnated wood cover instead of felt; bakelite screw caps; bakelite cups and aluminium cups. Tucked into his waistbelt are two M34 stick grenades.

Bottom right: Self-propelled artillery (Panzerartillerie) crewman. He is wearing a special jacket cut identically to the black Panzer jacket but in field grey. On his shoulders are a pair of black wool shoulder boards with red artillery waffenfarbe. He is holding a 10.5mm shell; these were often carried in wicket baskets such as the one visible in the foreground of the picture. He would wear a helmet as here when there was any likelihood of return fire on his battery.

Not all members of the 12th SS Panzer Division were as well dressed and equipped as here, and on occasion had to make their own camouflage smocks from 'scrounged' supplies of cloth. The boys' fathers frequently helped out with equipment too.





INITIALLY MONTROSE relied upon the three regiments of Irish mercenaries commanded by Alasdair McCholla, who joined him at Blair Atholl in August 1644 and provided a solid core of trained soldiers around whom he could begin to build an army.

In July, when they first land-

Map of north-east Scotland showing principal Royalist recruiting areas. The troops raised in these areas were fencibles serving in territorial rather than clan regiments and it is interesting to note that 100 years later the Jacobites, still relying on the old fencible system, raised regiments in the same localities.

Montrose's Army

STUART REID

Paintings by RICK SCOLLINS

THE ARMY OF James Graham, 1st Marquess of Montrose, is — like the later Jacobite ones — frequently portrayed as a wild band of undisciplined highland swordsmen. In fact, it included more Irish than Scots, most of them conventionally equipped soldiers. In only one of his battles, Kilsyth on 15 August 1645, did Montrose muster a preponderance of highlanders.

ed in Scotland, the Irish had numbered some 1,500 or 1,600 men, 'brocht up in West Flanderis, expert soldiouris'.

A good illustration of a typical Civil War infantry battalion, provided in this case by the Duke of York's Brigade (English Civil War Society). A surprisingly high proportion of Montrose's infantry were equipped and mustered in this fashion.

Victorian writers happily seized upon the fact that their commander was a Scot and a highlander to boot, to convince themselves that the brigade was actually comprised of highlanders rather than early Fenians, but an examination of its rolls actually reveals no more than four companies (out of 29) which can be identified as being at last partly comprised



Musketeer in high-waisted leather doublet. Ammunition and slow-match are carried in a satchel slung over the left shoulder, as depicted in one of Koler's prints showing Scots mercenaries in Germany. Wishart noted that few if any of the Irish at Tippermuir had swords.

of highlanders; McCholla's near relations and personal followers, forming his Lifeguard. The majority of the soldiers were in fact native Irishmen, chiefly from Ulster (there was also a strong Anglo-Irish catholic element) and led by officers with names like O'Hara, McQuillan, O'Neil, Reilly and McHenry, as well as McDonnell. A number of them too were professional soldiers from the Spanish Army of Flanders.²

With the 2,000 muskets promised by the Confederate Council, the Earl of Antrim, who raised the brigade, ought to have been able to equip all the Irish with firearms. There is, however, no reliable evidence that he actually received all of them, and George Wishart, presumably taking Montrose himself as the source, merely states that at Tippermuir they were very poorly armed. They had, he says in his Latin, neither swords nor long pikes (*hastis longioribus*), though from other evidence it would appear they were well enough provided with half-pikes and it would be surprising if McCholla's Lifeguard, comprised very largely as it was of 'gentlemen', could not muster a few broadswords between them. Indeed, when Lord Kilpont was murdered shortly afterwards Wishart comments that the killer escaped because the



night was so dark that the sentry could not see the end of his pike!³

On the other hand, one of the Gordon historians, Patrick Gordon of Ruthven, declares that Montrose had to move north after Tippermuir because his infantry were all musketeers 'soone brokin by horsemen, when they want the strength of pickes'.⁴ This might seem conclusive were it not for the fact that in the Justice Mills fight, two weeks later, Montrose was reported to have 'desired his men to lay aside their muskets

and pikes and fall on with sword and dirk'. In any case conclusive evidence for the presence of pikemen comes from Ruthven's description of the military funeral afforded to Donald Farquharson of Monaltrie in March 1645.⁵ He was, it seems, seen into his grave by one of the Irish regiments' with all the usual military courtesies including the 'trailing of pikes, and thundering vollee of muskets'.

The answer probably lies in the fact that the three regiments were of very unequal size, one

of them, Thomas Laghtman's, being twice as strong as the other two: O'Hahan's and McDonnell's. If contemporary English experience may be relied upon the former probably maintained a ratio of two musketeers to each pikeman while the latter, being rather too weak to do so, were entirely comprised of musketeers.

McCholla's Lifeguard, although mustered with the brigade, appears almost from the first to have operated as an independent unit, numbering little over a hundred men. Gaelic historians praising McCholla's exploits naturally refer quite frequently to his personal following and their broadswords but it is important to appreciate the distinction between them and the conventionally equipped regulars forming the larger part of the brigade.

One of Montrose's chief concerns during his campaigns was to raise more men and in particular to secure the active co-operation of the Gordons, since it was clear that the Irish, although formidable fighters, were a finite resource. Despite receiving reinforcements over the winter it is evident that within a year over half of them had died in battle or of disease, or deserted (not an unusual rate of wastage for the period and circumstances). When McCholla withdrew the 20 of his Lifeguard after Kilsyth only 500 remained to fight at Philiphaugh. It should not, incidentally, be supposed that all of the missing men had died, for Irish soldiers were to turn up all over Scotland during the next few years, sometimes in the most unlikely places, fighting for anyone willing to hire them.

Rick Scollins' reconstructions on the following two pages show (A) and (B) a pikeman and musketeer of the Strathbogie Regiment. These tough regulars were recruited from the rich farming areas of Banffshire and north-west Aberdeenshire, centred around the town of Huntly. Some highlanders may well have served in its ranks but it was certainly not a clan regiment. The hoddie grey clothing depicted is based upon contemporary illustrations and actual 17th century garments recovered from a peat bog at Quintfall Hill in Sutherland (see 'M' 19). The black ribbons were noted by John Spalding as having been adopted by Huntly's men in April 1644 'quhillk wes ane signe to fight to the death, bot it provit vtherways'.

The regiment was, by the

standards of the time well equipped. In 1639 Huntly had armed it from a shipment comprising '2,000 muscats, bandillieris, and myscat staves, 1,000 pikis with harness and armour both for foot men and horse men, carabius, horse peeces, pistollis, pulder, leid and matche' which was delivered from England on 17 March. Much of this equipment was subsequently seized by the Government forces, not before a troop of cuirassiers had given them a fright in a fight near Stonehaven, but it is evident from Spalding's description of the regiment in 1644 that sufficient muskets and pikes were salted away.

From the first Montrose recruited highlanders to eke out his all too meagre regulars, but as Ruthven remarks 'they could not be kept longer than they were

loadin with plunder, for they gott na other pay, and therefore could not be sworne to there culloures'.

(C) an Irish officer in the same battle. Many of the brigade's officers were professional soldiers, some of them trained up in the Spanish Army of Flanders. Their clothing will have reflected this background and some indications of it are apparent from details of the depredations carried out by the Irish. In March 1645, for example, the material seized from Aberdeen included gold and silver lace and 'rich appurrell' for some of the officers. This doubtless explains why, when McCholla's servant was apprehended during the retreat from Dundee shortly afterwards he was carrying his master's 'hatt, cloke and a paire of gloves'.

(D) an Irish musketeer at the

Justice Mills fight outside Aberdeen on 13 September 1644. John Spalding, an eyewitness, afterwards wrote that Montrose 'wes cled in cot and trewis as the Irishes wes cled. ilk one had in his cap or bonet ane rip of oatis quhillk wes his sign'. This man wears plain white trews and what appears to be a knitted Manninuth Cap, both of them used to identify Irish rebels in contemporary caricatures, including some cavalry cornets. In time he will become more conventionally dressed. After Tippermuir £1,300 worth of cloth was seized from Perth merchants, while Alasdair McCholla boasted that the plunder from Aberdeen 'hath made all our soldiers cavaliers'. In March 1645 another visit to the hagg netted McCholla £10,000 (Scots) worth of material for clothing his men.







Colours of the Strathbogie Regiment, reconstructed from a contemporary description by John Spalding. 'He (the Marquis of Huntly) causit mak sum ensignes, quhair on ilk syde wes drawin ane red rampand Lion, haueing ane crown of gold above his heid, and C.R. for CAROLUS REX, haueing this motto, FOR GOD, THE KING AND AGAINST ALL TRAITTORS, and beneath, GOD SAVE THE KING.' The field colour was presumably yellow.

Patrick Graham of Inchbrackie raised a regiment for Montrose in Atholl, largely comprised of highlanders, which served intermittently over the next two years without greatly distinguishing itself. It tended in fact to be rather unreliable and prone to going home.

John Graham, Lord Kilpont, joined Montrose with another regiment just before Tippermuir, although it disintegrated shortly afterwards, having originally been raised for service with the Government forces only to be press-ganged into the Royalist ranks. Kilpont's Regiment is frequently alleged in secondary sources to have been comprised of bowmen, but the only contemporary evidence, in a letter written by one of the Irish officers, is a rather vague allusion to the Royalists' left wing at Tippermuir, and in point of fact apparently relates to some Keppoch MacDonalds. Wishart on the other hand refers to them as 'armed' (which in context suggests something better than archaic bowmen) and in describing the Royalist dispositions at Tippermuir, he states that Kilpont's men were placed on the left specifically because the Irish 'who had neither long pikes nor swords, if placed on the wings would have been exposed to the enemy's cavalry'.⁹ The obvious implication of this statement must be that unlike most of the Irish,

Kilpont's men did have pikes.

This short-lived unit was in time replaced by two incomparably better ones raised in the north-east of Scotland; one was led by Colonel Donald Farquharson of Monaltrie 'who, out of Strathawin (where he was bailie to Huntly), and Aboyn and Die syd, had alwayes a standeing regi-ment'.² This description clearly suggests something rather more formidable than the usual mob of clansmen and, indeed, Monaltrie had attempted to get muskets and pikes for his men in 1639.¹⁰ After his death in early 1645 the regiment was divided in two; one battalion largely comprised of Deeside men, being commanded by Colonel James Farquharson of Inverey, and the Strathavon men by Colonel William Gordon of Minimore.

The other regulars belonged to the Strathbogie Regiment, first raised in 1639 around Strathbogie, Gartly, Enzie (lower Speyside) and Auchindoun, 'new levied souldiours, whom Huntly had caused to train'.¹¹ This proved to be a remarkably resilient unit, disbanded and reformed on a number of occasions through the years. A detachment was described by John Spalding in April 1644 as comprising 'about 60 mvskitteiris and pikonieris, with tua cullouris, ane drum, and ane bag pipe'.¹² By 1645 it



Irish colour from a contemporary list (Thomasson E14(3) True Informer) of colours carried by Irish troops embarked in the summer of 1644; yellow with a red saltire in the canton. 'Christ arisen, motto EXURGAT DEVS, DISSIPETVR INIMICI'. These colours, variously adorned with Catholic imagery, appear to be linked with the Irish Brigade. James Fraser, in his account of Auldearn, several times mentions McCholla's yellow banner, and this may well be it. The motto would certainly be appropriate.

had become a well-known sight on Scots battlefields and James Fraser recorded how Hurry's men recognised the Strathbogie Regiment as it swept around the south of the village to spearhead the rebel counterattack.¹³ One reason for its success appears to have been a deliberate policy of appointing professional soldiers to command it. In 1639 it had been trained by the very capable Lieutenant-Colonel William Johnston, and in 1644 it was led by a Colonel King. Its final commander appears to have been John Gordon of Littlemill, who served 'first as ane captane, then as Major and last as Lieutenant colonell'.¹⁴

One of the strengths of these units raised in the north-east was that they were not clan regiments or personal retinues, but fencibles raised on a geographical basis in precisely the same way as the Government forces. They were in effect a well organised militia easily dispersed and later re-assembled under different leaders.

Perhaps fittingly, having won the first battle of the war at Turriff on 14 May 1639, the Strathbogie Regiment was in at the last; the storming of Aberdeen on 14 May 1646.

The generally accepted picture of highland levies, which portrays them as well-armed swordsmen, is not supported by contemporary evidence. Ruthven notes that the Atholl and

Badenoch men who fought under Montrose at Tippermuir had 'swords, bowes, and tyre-lockes'.¹⁵ Fortunately these arms can be quantified fairly accurately since a detailed survey was carried out in five Atholl parishes in 1638 aimed at assessing its military potential. This lists the numbers of weapons held by some 451 individuals, some of whom as heads of households must have been responsible for equipping others. No count appears to have been made of unarmed men. All but 11 of the 451 lacked 'Swords', but as only 124 of them also had both targes and 92 out of the 100 muskets available, it may safely be concluded that three-quarters of the 'swords' were in fact clarks. Indeed no fewer than 239 men had nothing else and were therefore to all intents and purposes as unarmed as those not included in the survey.¹⁶

Although not all of the individuals encompassed in the survey will have been with Montrose at Tippermuir, the figure of 451 men actually approximates fairly closely to the number said to have served there in Inchbrackie's Regiment.

It is quite clear, moreover, from these figures that however one interprets the 'swordsmen', only a quarter of those counted actually conformed to the stereotypical picture of the highlander as a warrior armed with broadsword, targe and musket — a picture which is in reality derived from the 18th century 'Mutineer' prints depicting members of the Black Watch executed in 1743. Another, less detailed survey, carried out in Glenorchy at the same time also confirmed that only a quarter of the men there were armed with muskets. Such a finding is remarkably close to some 18th century evidence. In 1746 General Henry Hawley issued a set of fighting instructions to this troops, based very heavily upon previous experience of facing highlanders:

'They commonly form their front rank of what they call their best men, or True Highlanders the number of which being always but few, when they form in battalions they commonly form four deep, & these Highlanders form the front of the four, the rest being lowlanders & arrant scum.'

Making due allowance for hyperbole and deliberate disparagement it is quite clear what Hawley was talking about. The highland 'gentlemen', boasting the full panoply of weapons, took their rightful

place in the front rank of the clan regiment, while their less well-armed tenants, servants and other dependants took post behind. Indeed, returns of weapons recovered from the battlefield of Culloden show that in 1746 these humbler clansmen had firelocks and bayonets rather than broad-swords. Fifty years earlier, according to James Philip of Almerieclose, most of the highlanders who gathered under Dundee at Dalcomera in 1689 had spears or half-pikes¹⁷ and this was very likely also the case during the Civil War for they were drawn very largely from the western clans, less able than the Athollmen to afford firelocks.

The vaunted highland charge was in fact very much a matter of bluff; being undisciplined and ill-provided with firearms, the only real tactic open to highlanders in a pitched battle was to come down upon their foes in a rush. Should they thereby, as frequently happened, panic the opposition into running, then great slaughter might ensue. Kipling's unforgettable phrase 'Remember it's ruin to run from a fight' sums up the results admirably.

On the other hand, should highlanders fail to intimidate their intended victims they usually displayed a certain reluctance to close with an unshaken foe. The example of the MacDonalds at Culloden is perhaps the best known example, but at Kilsyth to instance another, the western clans began a charge in fine style only to very

quickly go to ground behind some stone walls as soon as it became apparent that the Government forces were unimpressed. They then remained behind the walls until the Royalist cavalry had beaten Balcarres' Regiment of Horse and gotten into the rear of the Government infantry, so that 'In the end the rebels leapt over the dyke, and with downe heads fell on and broke these regiments'.¹⁸

Highlanders, in short, were somewhat unreliable, at times capable of spectacular success, but all too brittle in the face of determined opposition. If their military effectiveness has been somewhat overestimated in the past, the crucial role played by the cavalry in Montrose's later victories has been correspondingly underestimated.

This is not altogether surprising since he had no cavalry at all at Tippermuir, a few musketeers at the Justice Mills and only a single, rather threadbare troop of horse at Inverlochy. On 18 February 1645, however, there was a startling development. Huntly's eldest son, Lord Gorrion, commanded a regular cavalry regiment which, based on Elgin, had prevented the rebels from gaining a solid foothold in the north-east. Suddenly, without warning, he defected to the rebels bringing the best part of his regiment with him. Well mounted and equipped, they provided the Royalists with a badly needed striking force which was a long way removed from the rude multitude of bonnet lairds

mounted on cart-horses imagined by John Buchan in his classic biography of Montrose.

At Auldearn Lord Gordon's Regiment mounted a precipitate two-pronged attack, riding straight in rather than relying on pistols and carbines:

'My Lord Gordon by this time charges the left wing, and that with a new form of fight, for he discharges all shooting of pistols and carbines, only with their swords to charge quhyt through their enemies, who were so many in number, and so stronge and weell horsed as if by a desperat charge they had got them not broken, it was too apparent that they might recover the day. But Aboyn having overthrowen the right wing, and the main battell left bair on that syde, and seeing Montrose and McDonnell joynd to give a new charge, the great body began to stagger, all their hopes being in their left wing; and that my lord Gordon charges so soundly with swords only, as if they scorned to be resisted; they had all sworn to go throw or dye'.¹⁹

The circumstances under which this attack was launched were rather fraught and it is not at all clear whether such tactics were employed on other occasions. Aboyne's squadron was certainly engaged in a firefight with Hackett's Horse at Alford.

The numbers of cavalymen available to the Royalists steadily rose during 1645 until at Kilsyth they fielded something in the region of 600, considerably outnumbering Baillie's men. Lord Gordon's Regiment

(commanded since his death at Alford by his younger brother, Aboyne) still mustered about 360 troopers, and to these were added a further 80 belonging to the Earl of Airlie's regiment, commanded there by Colonel James Ogilvie of Baldowie, a veteran of the Swedish service. As if these were not sufficient there were also 120 dragoons raised by Aboyne and 100 or so Irish dragoons commanded by Captain John Mortimer, a sometime company commander in Colonel Manus O'Cahan's Regiment.²⁰

The greatest weakness in the Royalist army was not of its own making. Highlanders, though welcome enough on the day, were far from dependable. What was required were more 'standing' regiments such as the Strathbogie men, willing to serve as soldiers rather than casual allies. It is greatly to the government's credit that, although defeated on the battlefield with distressing frequency, it succeeded in preventing Montrose from establishing himself and turning a dangerous rebellion into a civil war. **MI**

Notes

1. John Spalding, *History of the Troubles in Scotland*, Vol II, p385.
2. Gilbert, *History of the Irish Confederation*, Vol IV, p54; and Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution* (1988), pp51, 176.
3. George Wishart, *Deeds of Montrose* (1893), p60.
4. *Ibid*, p64.
5. Patrick Gordon of Ruthven, *Balances Distemper*, p78.
6. *Ibid*, p112.

Left: Irish colour; white with a red saltire on a yellow canton, 'blood red crucifix with the motto AQUUM EST PRO CHRISTO MORI'.

Centre: The 'King's standard of foote' taken at Cadisdale in 1650, made of black taffeta 'with a man's head in the middle, bleeding, as if cutt off

from a body'. It is clear from Sir James Balfour's rather ingenious description that the head in question was that of Charles I.

Right: Irish colour; red, 'the name of Jesus', with the motto 'IN NOMINE JESUS OMNE GENU FLECTITUR'.





7. Spalding Vol II, p456; see also Buirgh records for 5 June referring to McColla 'with two regiments of Irishes for burleing of Donald Fairquharson' in March. Aberdeen Council Letters Vol III, p116 & 119, refer to the quailing of Irish infantry — the only unit present in the burgh at the time of the funeral.
8. Wishart, p56-60.
9. Ruthven, p110.
10. Spalding, Vol I, pp145, 163.
11. John Gordon of Rulliemay, *History of Scots Affairs*, Vol II, p257.
12. Spalding, Vol II, p349.
13. James Fraser, *Chronicles of the Frasers*, p295.
14. J.M. Bulloch, *The House of Gordon; Gordons under Arms*, no 835(a).
15. Ruthven, p78.
16. *Chronicles of the Atholl & Tullibardine Families*, Appendix.
17. James Phillips, *The Graemid*, p122-4.
18. Baillie's 'Vindication' in R. Baillie: *Letters & Journals*, Vol II, p422.
19. Ruthven, p126-6.
20. *Ibid*, p136.

Above left: Clansman in belted plaid, armed with lochalier axe. The pronounced resemblance to a bundle of washing with legs doubtless accounts for the difficulty experienced by contemporary artists in depicting tartans.

Above right: Cavalry trooper in Littlecote type bullcoat. It is actually fastened with hooks and eyes and the lacing on the front is, except at top and bottom, decorative. The distinctive yellow colouring derives in this case from the fish oil used to dress the leather and render it waterproof, although the Littlecote ones have actually been dyed yellow.

Right: Cavalry officer wearing a heavy double-sleeved bull coat similar to that in the well-known Nathaniel Fiennes portrait, and equipped with sword, carbine and dog-lock pistol. Note the heavy knitted wool bonnet.



IT IS CLEAR that the Roman legion of Flavian date had its own complement of torsion artillery. In describing a legion of probably 3rd century AD date, Vegetius stated that each century was equipped with an arrow-shooter and each cohort a stone-thrower. Appropriate to our 1st century period is the description of Vespasian's army of three legions during the Jewish War (AD 66-73) by Flavius Josephus, who stated that it had a total of 160 artillery pieces. As this equates closely with the number of legionary centuries in this army (180), it is likely that each century was normally equipped with a catapult, not unlike the 'heavy weapons platoon' in a modern infantry company. As the recreated *Legio XIII*'s primary goal is to accurately depict a century (albeit a somewhat under-strength one), it was important for the group to have a typical arrow-shooting 'scorpion' catapult of the period.

At some time in the late 1st or very early 2nd century AD, the centuries-old and familiar wood-framed catapult of Hellenistic design was superseded by the iron-framed *cheiromballista* as depicted on Trajan's Column. (An excellent account of both types, and Roman artillery in general, was written by Dr Paul Holder for *Military Illustrated* Nos 2 and 3, so we need not go into great technical detail here.)

The Frankfurt 'headquarters' for the *Legio XIII* group is only minutes away from the Saalburg, the famous reconstruction of a Roman auxiliary cohort fortress, and perhaps the world's Mecca for the study of Roman artillery. It is here that the largest collection of ancient catapult reconstructions are displayed, built by General-leutnant Erwin Schramm, an

On the ramparts of the Saalburg fort, men of *Legio XIII* (with an oriental auxiliary archer in the background) wind back the slider of General Schramm's surviving 1916 reconstruction of a catapult of 2nd Punic War date found at Anipurias in Spain; it is virtually identical to the later scorpion, and experiments suggest that a range of around 300m was normal. Catapult bolt heads have been found on the sites of several Roman battles: one British hillfort apparently surrendered without an infantry assault after the chief's house was riddled with bolts in a demonstration of firepower...

Legio XIII GMV: Roman Legionaries Recreated (6)

DANIEL PETERSON

CONCLUDING OUR series of articles by a founder-member of a leading German-based Roman army re-enactment and living history' group on the Flavian period legionary, we consider briefly the legion's integral light field artillery.



The actual surviving front plate from a scorpion abandoned on the field of Cremona, AD 69 — the battle which secured Vespasian's bid for the throne. Above the central aperture can just be made out 'LEGIO XIII MAC', identifying it as belonging to *Legio XIII* Macedonica — which shared the Mainz garrison workshops with *Legio XIII* in the period immediately before the Claudian invasion of Britain. The other markings give the names of the consuls in office at the time of manufacture — AD 45 — and show that when lost in battle this catapult was more than 20 years old.

officer of Kaiser Wilhelm II's army. Carrying on in Schramm's tradition is the current director of the Saalburg museum, Dr Dietwulf Baatz, himself appropriately a former

artillery officer of the Wehrmacht and perhaps the world's foremost expert in the field of ancient artillery.

It was on his recommendation that *Legio XIII* reconstruct-

ed the *Legio XIII* Macedonica 'scorpion' lost at the AD 69 battle of Cremona. This was several years before Dr Holder's article brought this important find to the general public's attention; but Dr Baatz had already published the find and kindly furnished his monograph, and additional guidance. He recommended this catapult as the ideal choice for the reconstruction group, as the original Cremona find might very well have been made in the same Mainz workshop as some original *Legio XIII* catapults.

This surprising revelation was based on the embossed bronze frontal plate which survives from the Cremona catapult. Much like the data plates affixed to modern weapons systems, the Cremona plate not only provided the name of the legion to which it belonged, but also the manufacture date, based on the Roman system of dating by the names of the current consuls. This dates the catapult's manufacture to AD 45, when *Legio XIII* Macedonica was in garrison at Mainz. Two years earlier *Legio XIII* Gemina was also stationed at Mainz, but left as part of Claudius' invasion force against Britain.

Obviously, this was enough to decide the group to base the *Legio XIII* catapult on the bronze plate and spring washers found at Cremona. A second, though less well-preserved, catapult front plate was also found at Cremona, this one from *Legio XVI* Gallica. This could indicate that these bronze plates were common to all catapults of the period.

The question might arise of how authentic it would be to





Members of the eight-man squad responsible for each legionary century's 'scorpio' steady the frame while one of the two vertical torsion springs is adjusted; the skein of rope passes round a horizontal metal peg, held by the tension of the spring into two recesses in the top edge of the circular bronze washer. This was mounted on a counterplate, and the washer rim and counterplate both had holes pivoted at two points, through which retaining pins were passed. By removing these and turning the washer with a lever, the tension of the two springs could be equalised. A variant has been recovered from an ancient shipwreck which suggests that some washers and counterplates were looted. The arrow was shot along the grooved wooden 'slider' which protrudes through the hole in the front plate.

equip a reconstructed unit of the Flavian period with a Claudian catapult of AD 45. The answer, of course, is that it is the closest thing possible; and it should be remembered that the *III Macedonica* scorpion was in service 24 years prior to its loss at Cremona. Like artillery tubes of a later day, Roman artillery pieces may have had great longevity. Excellent, albeit 'modern' proof of this was the test firing in 1979 of Schramm's 1916 reconstruction of the Ampurias catapult, an engine very similar to *Legio XIII's* reconstruction of the *III Macedonica* find. In 1918 the catapult launched an arrow a distance of 305 metres; in 1979, using the same horsehair torsion springs installed 64 years earlier, the catapult shot an arrow a still impressive 285 metres.

Constructing the catapult was a fairly time-consuming affair, not so much because of the labour but because of the difficulty in obtaining suitable materials. With the notable exception of Schramm's catapults at the Saalburg, all subsequent reconstructions known to this writer are by comparison crude affairs employing cheap, lightweight woods, and torsion springs made of hemp or manilla rope, or in some cases even nylon or rubber.

It was decided that the *Legio XIII* scorpion would be consistent with the same high standards of authenticity as the rest of the group's equipment. The frame is oak, possibly over 400 years old, as it was salvaged from a building of that age being torn down. The torsion spring washers are bronze, closely copied from the

Cremona originals. The torsion springs were made of horsehair, just as were Schramm's, and undoubtedly, as were many ancient originals (though animal tendon was the first choice). The horsehair rope was the most difficult item to procure until a source was discovered in Mexico. (I am told that horsehair lariats are still popular in the south-western US and northern Mexico due to a superstition of their ability to deter rattlesnakes from crossing over them and into the bedding of sleeping cowboys!)

The completed catapult performs well, though it has not yet been fully torqued to test its maximum range. As it very closely approximates Schramm's reconstruction of the Ampurias catapult, both in dimensions and materials, it is likely that it would also duplicate the former's performance, and shoot an arrow to about 300 metres.

A second catapult is now under construction; this is a small *ballista* designed to launch grapefruit-sized stones. Also of oak with horsehair torsion springs, its bronze washers are based on the largest of the three from Ephra. Its design is largely inspired by Schramm's *palintonon*, which was sadly destroyed during World War II.

IN CONCLUSION

THIS ENDS our brief review of the activities, the reconstructed equipment, and the briefest notes on the researches and experiments carried out by the re-created *Legio XIII Gemina Martia Victrix* group based at Frankfurt. A much fuller text, about 120 colour photographs, and material from other leading

groups will be found in the author's book *The Roman Legions Recreated in Colour Photographs* (Windrow & Greene Ltd., Europa Militaria Special No 2; ISBN 1-872004-06-7; £12.95).

In the first part of the series in *MI* No 46 we pointed out that, in an eerily exact repetition of the history of the historical 14th Legion, the impending transfer of US Army elements whose personnel form a major part of the recreated Roman unit threw into doubt the group's future location and activities. We are glad to report that the group will live on, now operating from a base close to the German city of Trier — also a major base in the days of the Roman occupation

of western Germany. The author will shortly take up duties as curator of the US 1st Armored Division's 'Old Ironsides' Museum, which opens at Baumholder in September. The contact addresses for the group will be: (from Europe) Daniel Peterson, Im Dom 69, 6580 Idar-Oberstein, Germany; (from the USA) Daniel Peterson, 222d Base Support Battalion, CMR 405 (Museum), APO AE 09034. **MI**

The reconstructed scorpion and its crew 'in the field'; note the elevation prop under the rear of the stock. The group carry arrows in a leather quiver; for prolonged engagements the Romans seem to have brought up large supplies in baskets.





British Army snipers, 1914-18

STEPHEN BULL

LIKE MANY OF the arts of trench warfare, sniping scarcely existed at the outbreak of the Great War. In some ways this is surprising because the verb 'to snipe' was in existence in the 18th century, and telescopic sights had been experimented with during the Napoleonic wars.

Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson of the Indian Army fitted telescopes to rifled percussion weapons in the 1830s and 1840s, and fairly extensive use of snipers with telescopic sights had been made in the American Civil War. In the South African War the Boers often used techniques which amounted to sniping, and in 1901 a sight known as 'Di Commons' telescopic sight was fitted to the Lee-Enfield.

In the autumn of 1914 the Germans were quick to realise the importance of sharpshooting in the developing war of position. They are thought to have deployed something like 20,000 rifles with telescopic sights by the end of the year,

AFTER A hesitant start, the art of sniping became highly refined by the end of the First World War. This article looks at sniping rifles, telescopes and periscopes, counter-sniper techniques, training and camouflage.

plus a number of sporting weapons collected by the Duke of Ratibor for Army use.

Sniping never inflicted the massive casualties of artillery or the mass attack but it restricted movement, lowered morale and denied the enemy observation and intelligence. The physical effects of the sniper's bullet were varied and often unpredictable. At moderate ranges a direct hit could produce a neat hole, little blood and a swift death. Close ranges or ricochets were a different story. The medical journals recorded exit wounds five inches across and there were instances of men with shattered heads and spilt brains who took hours to die.

British tactics always stressed

the link between scouting and sniping, and the objective was not only to kill the enemy but to find out what they were doing and relay that information to the forward observation posts of the artillery, machine-gun officers and the staff.

Early attempts at sniping owed more to the skills and equipment of the 'big game' hunter and the enthusiasm of individual officers than any organised system of military training. Three Majors were amongst the most influential pioneers, because they not only developed the techniques but put them into print and helped to set up the sniping schools which subsequently became an established part of the training

Instructional photo taken at First Army School of Sniping circa 1917 showing the relative appearance of the prone soldier in service dress, and the sniper in the Hawkins position with camouflage suit. The Horse Artillery Lance Bombardier, right, is remarkably obvious in his neat uniform and flat topped cap. The sniper, left, is aided by the low Hawkins position, the hood, rifle cover, and absence of insignia. (IWM.)

system. This trio were H. Hesketh-Pritchard, F.M. Crum and T.F. Fremantle, and it is on their reminiscences that this article is largely based.

SNIPER RIFLES

Early sniper rifles were of two main types, sporting guns, most

Another picture in the same series, this time amongst a root crop. Both have better chances of survival but whilst the sniper has all but disappeared the artilleryman is still betrayed by his cap. (IWM.)





of which were private purchases, and issue weapons fitted with special sights. Sporting rifles came in every conceivable calibre and type; Lieutenant L. Greener of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment (nephew of the famous gun-maker W.W. Greener) carried a Ross Model 1905 .280 sporter with Zeiss prismatic telescope to great effect; Crum's sniper section in the King's Royal Rifle Corps took with them a .416 Rigby rifle. Hesketh-Pritchard experimented with all kinds of rifle from a Jeffreys high velocity .333 right through to the most monstrous of elephant guns⁴.

Amongst the service patterns the SMLE Mk III was most available but there were other options. Some used the older 'Charger Loading' or 'Long' Lee-Enfield, others opted for the American made 'P 14' as it became available. A few lucky characters managed to obtain captured German equipments, usually the Gewehr 98 fitted with Zeiss, Goerz or Luxor telescopes.

The Canadians, whose forces started the war with the Ross rifle, also used it widely for sniping. It was certainly accurate, but as a general issue weapon

Sniper of the London Irish Rifles in Albert, 6 August 1918. Equipped with an SMLE with offset telescope, the sniper wears a steel helmet and trousers cut down to make shorts. This particular daylight patrol was less than a success: of the seven taking part one was killed and three wounded. (IWM.)

was too delicate for the hurly burly and filth of the trenches. There were horror stories of incorrectly fitted bolts flying out into the faces of their users but authenticated instances of this grisly accident are few and far between⁵. In early 1915 Canadian battalions were equipped with four Ross rifles fitted with telescopic sights, usually of the American Warner and Swasey prismatic type.

Lack of optical equipment was a problem from the outset as the industry was dominated by German manufacturers. Until the summer of 1915 the army was largely dependent on private purchases and sights bought in from commercial gun companies. Up to July 1915, 1,260 government orders were placed for telescopic sights and the list of suppliers was a veritable directory of top class sporting gun makers including Purdy, Holland and Holland, Churchill, Lancaster, Rigby, Westley Richards and Jeffrey. These scopes were expensive pieces of equipment costing anything between £6 and £13 when at the same time an SMLE cost £3.10s and a Mills bomb

5s. When not actually fitted to the rifle these sights were usually carried in leather cases with buckle-down flaps on a sling over the shoulder⁶.

Additionally, numbers of 'magnifying' or 'Galilean' sights were also employed. As Fremantle described them they consisted of a convex and a concave lens in which the target was seen the right way up. The lenses were not linked but merely attached individually to the gun at muzzle and breech. They had a narrow field of view and it was not possible to fit any cross hairs, but they did have compensations. A set could be bought for between 10s and £5, they required little or no 'setting up' and were easy to use⁷.

Of the four main types used by British snipers the Lattey optical sight was the most widely used and consisted of two very simple lenses. The Neill sight (also known as the 'Barnet' or 'Ulster') was a little more complicated by being offset to the left, allowing the ordinary sight to be used if desired. The sights of Martin and Gibbs were the most complex featuring an adjustable rear aperture⁸.

It was not until May 1915 that an official specification for the fitting of telescopes to service rifles was finally approved and even then it was in the most general terms to allow the use of as many of the available stocks as possible. Importantly, however, it was stated that rifles with sights of this sort were to be submitted to the Chief Inspector of Small Arms at Enfield for approval and that the drums would be calibrated after testing at Bisley⁹. Only in 1916 was anything like mass production of telescopic sights for the SMLE achieved. Over half of those issued then came from the Periscopic Prism Co of Kentish Town, with Aldis of Birmingham the second largest producer and Winchester the third. These three manufacturers between them produced over 90 per cent of the 10,000 telescopic sights provided for SMLEs by the end of the war.

Strangely, the majority of these sights were not mounted centrally over the barrel but offset to the left, allowing the rifle to be loaded with the normal five-round clips. This had at least two disadvantages which the sniper officers pointed out. Firstly, it was not always possible to take aim comfortably. To get the head in the right position many men resorted to screwing an extra piece of wood to the rifle butt, sticking a shell dressing to the woodwork to act as a cheek piece or resting the head



Sniper/observer team of the 1/4th Royal Berkshire Regiment in the roof of Auton's Farm near Ploegsteert Wood, spring 1915. Both men wear knee length gaiters; the observer uses binoculars from his perch on the ladder. A second pair of field glasses is just visible on the sniper's rifle.

on an ammunition bandolier. Just as importantly, the side-mounted scope required a wider loop or gap to fire through, making the sniper an easier target and limiting his traverse. As Hesketh-Pritchard pointed out in both his *Sniping in France* and *The Field* magazine after the war, the offset scope was in any case based on dubious reasoning. Clip loading was critical to rapid fire, but the sniper was not intended to get into situations of this sort — he was in the business of single, aimed and unexpected shots. Each shot might be taken rapidly at a fleeting target, but seldom did the victim stand around waiting for a full magazine. In any case many snipers preferred not to shoot more than once for fear of revealing their position¹⁰.

Complaints led to more scopes being mounted in the overhead position but only in 1917 was a completely new layout devised for use with the P 14 rifle when a German Hensoldt telescope with adjustable fittings was captured. The complete new assembly approved in April 1918 was known as the 'Rifle, Magazine .303in Pattern 1914, Mk 1* (W) T'. The 'W' stood for Winchester as the Winchester-made P 14 had been found most reliable and were always used in the making up of sniper sets. The scope itself was known as the Model 1918 and was made by Aldis¹¹.

TELESCOPES AND PERISCOPES

Observation equipment was the sniper's 'other weapon', used both to locate the enemy for sniping and to provide useful information. Stalker's and signaller's telescopes and tubular periscopes were widely favoured for a number of reasons. The normal 'box' periscope of the sentry was generally too bulky though it gave a good field of view. Periscope mirrors mounted on bayonets were likewise suitable for the infantry but of limited use to the sniper specialist who preferred to remain undetected with his weapon pointed in the direction of the enemy. Binoculars were sometimes used but presented a direct and relatively broad target.

The telescope, by contrast, was already the favoured instrument of the game and target shooter. It presented little for the enemy to see and could be pushed between sandbags, or through narrow gaps, or even left set up in a steady rest. Many were provided with a pull-out shade which kept direct light off the lens and prevented tell-tale



Canadian sniper taking aim circa 1916. He is using a 'sporterized' Ross rifle with the fore end of the woodwork cut away mounted with a Winchester telescope. He wears some rather non-regulation boots and the soft version of the service cap with ear flaps. (IWM.)

reflections. When brought rapidly into use, Fremantle recommended that the shade be opened first and the telescope itself be slid smoothly to prearranged settings which could be scratched on the outside of the tube¹². Even so, the observer had to be extremely careful and keep his wits about him as sniper F.A.J. Taylor of the 2nd Battalion The Worcestershire Regiment found out when peering from a well prepared hide near Ypres in 1918.

'I was gaining experience in using the telescope when one day I became suspicious of a small dark, triangular patch in a mound of earth about three hundred yards in front. Staring at it for some time I couldn't make out what was a light circular patch in the middle of it. When, to my utter amazement I saw very clearly the side of the face of a German, with light brown hair. His profile showed as he turned away. I kept watching as I speculated, then suddenly I saw a wisp of smoke and instinctively ducked as his bullet zipped viciously through the sandbags over my head¹³.

An officer appeared on the scene and attempted to snipe back at the German, but it was only when artillery could be brought to bear that he was dislodged.

Second Lieutenant Oliver of the 2nd Battalion Durham Light Infantry at a sniper's post, Hobb's Farm, near Houplines, 1915. The rifle is a sporting Ross presented to the battalion

SNIPER TACTICS

The official number of snipers per battalion was fixed at eight, though many experts preferred more. Crum, writing in 1916 recommended an establishment of 16 men, a sergeant, a corporal and an officer, and thought that up to 24 might be required. Taylor's section in the Worcestershires was at least 13 at the end of the war including a sergeant and corporal and this was by no means unusual.

Though sniping was a dangerous occupation it did have attractions. Snipers were usually excused fatigues and were

not normally deployed at night. Though they had a good deal of special equipment to clean and carry, it was not as arduous as machine-guns or working parties.

Occasionally men worked as loners but standard practice was to operate in pairs, one man observing with the telescope or periscope and the other ready with the rifle. Where possible these pairs were spread across the battalion front to give the greatest coverage and relieved at intervals by fresh men. Sniping NCOs were allotted sectors of this front to oversee by



the battalion officer in charge of the operation who was known variously as the 'sniping' or 'intelligence' officer.

Within each pair one man usually specialised in the shooting and the other in observation, but when the concentration of the latter lapsed it was better to swap duties for a while. It was desirable that the pairs chose their own partners for a personality clash or misunderstanding could have fatal results. Depending on the cover available the sniper would fire from virtually any position but prone often presented the least target and the best chance of blending with the surroundings. Many used the 'Hawkins' position in which the toe of the rifle butt actually rested on the ground, giving a steady aim and less stress on the rifleman. Sandbags, slings, rests and depressions in the ground could all be used to improve accuracy.

When a shot was taken the sniper kept a few simple points in mind. First, polished technique was not as important as consistency; provided he did the same thing every time he would be accurate. The same was true of equipment and ammunition, he should stick to the same rifle, the same cartridges — clean and corrosion free. Next, when a target was located the sniper would look in the general direction then bring the gun up to the target area. Searching through the rifle scope was all right as a supplement to the observer's work but not the way to take a quick shot. Lastly, the firer had to be conversant with the principles of 'aiming off'. Many telescopic sights were fixed, but even when they were not there was seldom time to adjust them for wind or a moving target. The rifleman had therefore to judge wind speed and movement when aiming, and allow for cross winds or 'aim off' ahead of the movement. These allowances were sometimes quite large. As Fremantle calculated, at 300 yards it was necessary to aim off between one and three feet depending on the strength of the wind. A Mark VII .303in bullet travelled 200yd in a quarter of a second; a walking man travels at about six feet per second so it required a shot 18in ahead of him to secure a hit at 200yd.

These factors therefore multiplied the degree of correction necessary to the extent that a running man at 600yd needed a correction of over 17ft! Clearly this was hardly likely to be successful so few snipers bothered with any moving targets over



Men of the American 77th Division receive instruction on camouflaged snipers at Mouille, May 1918. As the original caption reads the sniper 'reveals himself'. Other photos in the same sequence show just how effective the 'Boiler Suit' was when combined with foliage. (IWM.)

300yd. Contrary to popular opinion, there was little work done at very long ranges and many sights were left set at 200yd¹⁴.

Whether snipers should regularly venture into no man's land was a matter of debate. To do so brought the gun closer to the target, often from an unexpected angle, and many good tallies were achieved in this way, yet there were also severe disadvantages as Herbert McBride, sniper with the Canadian 21st Battalion pointed out.

"When it comes to crawling alone out in front of your own trenches... I am off that stunt also — by preference, that is — although I have done quite a bit of it. Here, a man is strictly 'on his own' and is apt to be pretty much up against it if anything goes wrong. His field of fire is much limited, no moving about can be indulged in, and generally but one or two shots may be fired before the show is over for the day. Then comes the long, fearful wait until darkness sets in, before the crawl back to your own trenches may be begun."¹⁵

If one did have to venture out beyond the line the best aid was a 'sniper's robe' or 'crawling suit' together with a camouflaged canvas cover for the rifle. These robes and suits came in a variety of patterns many of which were made, or at least

painted, near the front. The earliest versions were often cut like a loose coat, with or without a hood. Usually of canvas, they could be painted with disruptive splotches of coloured paint to break up the outline of the body. The coat design was found to impede crawling so later versions were made like baggy boiler suits. By the end of the war Corps Camouflage Dumps were concentrating on two moderately standard types, the 'Boiler Suit' pattern, with detached scrim hood, rifle cover and gloves, and the very modern-looking 'Symien Sniper Suit' of painted scrim. This was basically a long loose-fitting jacket with separate legs or trousers but with an integral hood. Again it was teamed with gloves and rifle cover. Other artistic touches could be added with local foliage, straw, vegetable stalks, etc, as appropriate to the surroundings. A simple alternative hood could be made by pulling a sandbag over the head and separating the fibres a little to create vision slots. Amongst trees a 'domino' or speckled hooded cape was sometime worn.

The key always was to blend into the background and not to present a definite outline or shadow. Obviously the sharp outline of the service cap was best avoided, or at the very least the wire stiffener could be removed to soften it. Sometimes, as Crum relates, the outline of the head was destroyed entirely with masks, painted to represent brick or stone, or covered with gauze¹⁶.

Many snipers remained in or around their own lines, often in posts connected by short saps. It

was important that there be a number of posts, well concealed and protected so that the teams could move from one to another to keep the enemy guessing as to their whereabouts and present fresh fields of fire. Many of them were hurried out through the front parapet, usually at night, and protected from showing light by a curtain behind. Protection was improved by steel loops or sandbags filled with stones or scrap metal, but these had to be used sparingly as they were a distinct liability in case of bombardment. Irregularity in the sandbag parapet was an advantage as it helped conceal the loops, while different coloured bags and splotches of dark paint helped to create a good disruptive effect. As far as possible real openings were set at an angle to the front making detection more difficult and giving enfilade fire¹⁷.

Where sniping was well organised the battalion 'Sniping Officer' kept a plan of the locations of the posts and the ordinary infantryman was kept out of them to avoid giving them away. Range cards would be kept in the post or on the curtain detailing distances and locations of enemy positions and important topographical features. Particular care was taken to avoid smoking or cooking near a post and the firers would attempt to conceal muzzle flash from the rifles by screening or shooting from just inside the aperture. Dust which could be raised by muzzle blast was best avoided or damped down with a little water¹⁸.

COUNTER-SNIPER WORK

One of the most important duties of the sniper was to locate and eliminate his opposite number on the other side of the line. Many ruses were used, designed mainly to get the enemy sharpshooter to give away his position. In many cases two or three British snipers worked together for this purpose. One of the team would provide the decoy, cautiously opening a loophole with a stick, showing a dummy-head, or firing a few rounds and when the German engaged him the rest of the team would come into play from different angles.

Some were too cautious to be taken in by such simple ploys and their lives had to be painstakingly located over a period of days. Hesketh-Pritchard became expert in examining the locations where enemy snipers had been active and judging their positions by the angles of bullet strikes on

trees and sandbags. One of his favourite devices was the dummy head, which could be made especially realistic with a cigarette between its lips, smoked at a distance by the sniper. When the head was struck by a bullet it could be lowered and examined to find the path of the shot¹⁹.

Armoured enemy loops presented a particular problem, since although the standard .303in round would 'ring the bell' when it hit such a target, it could not penetrate. Short of calling down artillery the best solution was high velocity sporting rifles or large calibre elephant guns. When the enemy tried to knock out British loops with similar guns the reply was the double loop. One steel plate was placed to the front in the ordinary way and concealed. To the rear of this was placed a second loop, ideally in a sliding rail. Loops were also constructed of two plates with the gap between packed with earth.

SNIPER TRAINING

In the early stages of the war sniping was slow to gain official approval, or the facilities for training which befitted such an important skill. This was probably both because of its 'dirty' reputation and because of the high degree of individualism it entailed. Sniping was allowed to develop as a branch of scouting and intelligence work, and

Though actually at Cape Helles, Gallipoli, the periscope rifle shown here was in widespread use on the Western front, allowing relatively safe shots to be taken over the top. This example was made by No 2 Field Company, Royal Naval Division, and is being used by Sub-Lieutenant W.E.S. Hope, RND, 1915. (IWM.)



official instructions appeared as a part of Army Stationery Service manual 195 *Scouting and Patrolling* 1917.

Training was only officially sanctioned at Army and Corps level in 1916, when the major

schools were established. Even then each establishment had its own curriculum and strengths. The principal aim of First Army School at Linghem was to turn out qualified instructors for the Corps schools, brigades and battalions. Second Army School at Acq had its own reconstruction of a German trench system in a disused quarry, and placed a strong emphasis on the scouting aspects. Night training was

also given with the men groping about in specially devised dark glasses watched by instructors. Fourth Army School was against the steep chalk slope at Bouchon and was equipped with prefabricated buildings made by the engineers at Amiens.

Battalion snipers could be trained virtually anywhere and usually received a course lasting about two weeks from the intelligence officer and senior NCOs, after which they were entitled to a distinctive badge. There were several patterns but later in the war the standard model was a brass fleur de lys worn on the right upper arm. The course was both practical and theoretical; surviving syllabuses show that there was usually a lecture in the morning, on observation, map reading, or telescopes; in the afternoon there would be a practical session. These included not only rifle shooting but unarmed combat and lessons in observation. Hesketh-Pritchard emphasised that the objective was not merely to produce accurate shots but quick shots.

'After finding out errors in the ordinary way by grouping, we eschewed as far as possible shooting at targets; the round black bull on the white ground was very rarely used, and all kinds of marks were put up in its place. The head and shoulders

Men of the Yorkshire and Lancashire Regiment preparing for a trench raid near Roclincourt, January 1918. The men wear various robes and crawling suits with both integral and separate hoods, some of which appear to be slit over the ears for improved hearing. One man wears gloves, another (sniping, centre) appears to have loosely fitting gaiters around his 'Boiler Suit' legs. (IWM.)



was the most efficacious target, and practice was further carried on at dummy heads carried at walking pace along trenches. In fact, where such appliances as we had at the school are lacking, it is far better to allow snipers to shoot at tins stuck up on sticks than to permit them to become pottering target shots.²⁰

Such exercises could be enlivened by watching an expert snipe from posts or a trench system and getting the men to work out where the shots were coming from, attempting to spot a camouflaged instructor, or patrolling across a piece of ground until spotted and chased off by an 'enemy'.

The most remarkable thing to the modern observer of this training was just how advanced it could be. The techniques of camouflage, shooting, movement and unarmed combat set forth by the enthusiasts of 1918 would be little out of place in the contemporary battle school.

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Notes

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I should particularly like to thank Mike Hibberd and Mike Willis of the Imperial War Museum and Paul Hannon for their help in the production of this article.

CURIO CORNER

A Massachusetts Volunteer

RICHARD L. HARRINGTON III

THE CHANCE acquisition of an American Civil War belt plate launched the author on an historical quest which produced some curious results and illustrates some of the problems of research.

It seemed evident because of the naturalisation paper that Credon had survived the war. I decided to pursue the matter a step farther and find out what happened to him in later life. Through visits to the city clerk's office in Salem, Massachusetts, and enquiries to the National Archives and Records Service in Washington, DC, I developed a thumbnail sketch of Credon's later life.

He was born in the parish of Clondrohid, Macroom, Cork, Ireland, and was baptised on 27 November 1839 (quite possibly he came to America because of the potato famine). He married Ann Miller in 1867. They had six children, John in 1868, Annie in 1871, Joanna in 1874, Mary in 1877, Daniel in 1878 and Kathleen in 1882. Credon evidently continued to work as a carrier in Salem after his discharge and applied for a disability pension in 1866, not because of his wounds, but rather 'varicose veins of the right leg and lame back' caused by a forced march in Virginia in February of 1863. The claim was disallowed but Credon persisted and was finally awarded a pension. He died on 12 November 1910 at the Soldiers Home in Maine of 'chronic intestinal nephritis', having survived the battles of Hanover Court House, Mechanicsville, Gaines' Mill,

Malvern Hill, Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, and Spottsylvania. Factoring in the potato famine, Cornelius Credon lived to a ripe old age indeed for the times.

As a final note, it is a common problem in researching historical records to find variant spellings of the subject's name. In this case the subject's surname was spelled variously Credon (on the belt plate), Creedin, Creeden, Creadon, Creadon, Creadin and Creden; his wife's maiden name is given as Miller and Millard on various records. This can be attributed to the phonetic spelling current at the time. Also there are other discrepancies such as age: his baptismal record is dated 1839 not his marriage certificate (1867) gives his age as 24 while his death certificate (1910) gives his age as 66. In such cases one must attribute this to faulty memory or clerical error if the rest of the evidence coincides with what has been learned. A good example of this is a copy of the birth certificate of one of Credon's children giving the birthdate of 1974. A good trick for a man who died in 1910! Rather than ask for a correction I've kept it as an example of the human error researchers must compensate for.

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The information all fits together nicely, but which wound was related to the artefact I had in my possession?

I next contacted Mr James Fahey, Archivist at the Massachusetts Military Division History and Research Museum in Natick. He sent two casualty rolls from the 9th Volunteers. The first, dated 3 May 1863 at Chancellorsville, lists Cornelius Credon, Company F, as slightly wounded. The second dated 14 May 1864 lists Cornelius Cierlon as twice wounded — right knee and head by musket balls. Eureka! This is the wound that evidently accounts for the damage to the cartridge box belt plate.



The Suffolk Regiment, 1685-1913(2)

RAY WESTLAKE



Fig A

THE 'ALBERT' shako was introduced by Horse Guards Circular Memorandum of 4 December 1843 and this new headdress can be seen being worn in Plate 1 (p.40) by a handsman and private of a light company. The remaining figure, a battalion company private, wears the undress cap with gilt numbers '12' at the front.

On the Albert shako the officers wore a universal gilt plate (4½ x 5½ inches) comprising a crowned star with a wreath (half-laurel and half-palm) in the centre. In the 12th Regiment the battle honours Minden, Gibraltar, Seringapatam and India were inscribed on to the main rays of the star and a two-towered castle placed at the bottom point. Different plates were worn according to companies: grenadiers (the fur cap now abolished) wore in the centre of their plate a grenade with '12' in the centre of a strap inscribed 'REGIMENT'. Light company officers had a hugh with '12' in the curl while battalion companies also bore the regimental number but in the centre of a strap inscribed 'EAST SUFFOLK' (Figs A, B and C).

The men's device for the new Albert shako was a round brass plate (3 inches in diameter) with crown above. A raised wreath (half-oak and half-laurel) edged the circle and regimental number which was placed in the centre. Light infantry and grenadiers again had in addition their special devices. For exam-



Fig B



Fig C

ples of this universal plate see page 63 of *Head-dress Badges of the British Army*, Volume 1, by A.L. Kipling and J.L. King.

Note the white uniform of the musician — double-breasted coat (no lace) with yellow wings, chevrons, turnbacks, collar, cuffs and piping. The oblong gilt crossbelt plate comprised the Roman numeral 'XII' with a crown above.



Fig D

In 1845 a new waistbelt clasp (burnished gilt with silver mountings) was introduced for wear by field ranks only (Fig D). The same year also saw the red and yellow striped sashes previously worn by sergeants discontinued and their place taken by a crimson one with one central yellow stripe.

Plate 2 (p.40) is dated '1846-1855' and features a battalion company officer with a grenadier company bugler. The laced loops and buttons on the skirts of officers' coatees were

abolished by a General Order dated 30 June 1848, leaving only the skirt ornaments.

The bugler's coatee is heavily laced — white with a red, yellow and black mixture. Note how the lines decorate the collar, the side body seams and arms. The large wings are a mix of yellow, black and red. Note the green bugle-cord and sword.

The plate also shows in the background a rear view of an officer in undress uniform. The blue frock coat with shoulder scales was, according to Colonel Webb, discontinued in 1848 and its place taken by a plain scarlet shell jacket, with collar and cuffs of the regimental facings and gilt shoulder cords. At the same time black patent leather sword belts and slings were introduced, and these were fastened by a gilt snake-clasp. For the officers' forage cap a new badge was introduced in 1847 comprising a crowned strap inscribed 'MONTIS INSIGNIA CALPE' with in the centre the castle with 'XII' below.

The two soldiers seen in the background left are wearing crossbelts with oblong gilt plates. Colonel Webb records that in 1850 a plain shoulder belt, without breastplate, to carry the pouch, was authorised, and the bayonets were hung on a frog from the waist belt. Colonel Webb also records the 1855-pattern long double-breasted tunic as being introduced on 1 April. Its lapels (for officers) were made to fold down at the top and show the yellow lining, but when on parade or duty were required to be buttoned over.

After only two years the single-breasted tunic, as seen in Plate 3 (p.40), replaced the above, the officers' badges of rank being placed on the collar as follows: Ensign — a silver

star; Lieutenant — a silver crown; Captain — a silver crown and star; Major — a gold star; Lieutenant-Colonel — a gold crown; and Colonel — a gold crown and star. All badges were embroidered.

The 1855 changes in uniform, brought about as a result of the Crimean War, also saw a new headdress. Modelled on the French pattern, the black shako was smaller than before and sloped forward (7¼ inches at the back, 5¼ inches at the front) and was about an inch less in diameter at the top than at the bottom. Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels were distinguished by two rows of gold regimental lace at the top. Majors had one. The gilt star plate, in the case of officers, had the numbers mounted on a black leather ground (Fig E); other ranks had plain gilt. The ball-tufts remained the same colours as before, until the abolition of flank companies in 1858 when all men wore white over red.



Fig E

The main figures in Plate 3 represent a Lieutenant-Colonel, his new white leather waistbelt being fastened by a silver and gilt clasp bearing the title 'EAST SUFFOLK REGIMENT' on the circle with a crown over '12' (silver) in the centre. Note his all-brass sword scabbard as worn by officers of field rank. The junior officer to the right of the illustration is wearing a blue frock coat and the new pattern blue forage cap with gilt embroidered numerals. His crimson sash is worn over the left shoulder, retained by a twisted crimson silk cord, and the sword scabbard in this case



Plate 1



Plate 2



Plate 3



Plate 5



Plate 4

Plate 6

Plate 7



THE SUIF
DEGUMES





Fig F

is black leather with gilt mountings.

P.W. Reynolds shows a good example of a drummer's tunic (rear view) with its wings and lines of lace. Both lace and wings were a mixture of red, white, black and yellow, but this pattern was gradually discontinued from 1866 and finally replaced in 1871 by a smaller red and white fringe, and universal pattern white lace with red crowns. Note also the bandsman's pattern sword. Two interesting post-1881 photographs of drummers (Figs F and G) show the full dress tunic with its laced wings, collar and arms, and serge frock coat with its narrow lace decorating shoulder straps and forming an Austrian knot of the sleeves. Green bugle cords are worn in both illustrations. Note the embroidered drummers' harlequin worn above the chevron. The Drum Major is also seen with his gold wings and highly decorated sash. He also wears, as a senior NCO, a red sash over the right shoulder, the opposite to the officers.

The last figure seen is a bandsman in white shell jacket and red cap (numeral 12 at the front), the latter, according to Colonel Webb, indicating that the wearer is from the 2nd Battalion that had been formed in 1858. In the 1st Battalion, it is later recorded, caps were white

with a red band and a crown as worn above the numerals.

The Drum Major is again seen in P.W. Reynolds's highly detailed painting of the band circa 1861-71 (Plate 4, p.41). White tunics (abolished in 1871) are worn by the musicians, yellow collars, shoulder straps, cuffs and wings, the latter decorated with white lace and red piping.




Fig H

In Plate 5 (p.40) the corporal wears a scarlet serge frock jacket with the brass Gibraltar Castle collar badges authorised in 1873 (Fig H). Also seen for the first time is the glengarry cap, introduced into the 12th Regiment in 1871 and bearing a brass badge comprising a star of 25 points surmounted by the Gibraltar Castle with the Key above, in the centre of a strap inscribed with 'MONTIS INSIGNIA CALPE' at the top and 'EAST SUFFOLK' at the bottom plus the numeral '12' (see *Head-dress Badges of the British*



Fig G

Army, Volume 1, item 437).

The field officer in the centre of the illustration wears the blue patrol jacket authorised, according to Colonel Webb, in 1867. His forage cap bears the Gibraltar Castle within a wreath. Note the black leather sashetache (abolished in 1900) and gilt spurs as worn by mounted officers.

In 1866 steel sword scabbards replaced the black leather type hitherto worn by all officers below field rank. Slashed cuffs were abolished in 1868 and instead pointed cuffs decorated with gold lace according to rank were introduced. A new shako, and the last to be worn until the introduction of the helmet in 1878, was worn from 1869, the old star plate being replaced by the badge seen in Fig I. (The men's shako plate had the regimental number in the centre.)



Fig I

New waistbelt clasps were introduced for officers in 1872, the crown above numerals being replaced by the Gibraltar Castle with scroll above 'GIBRALTAR' and below 'MONTIS INSIGNIA CALPE'. (See officer on right, Plate 5.)

Plate 6 (p.41) illustrates various orders of dress as worn in 1913. As a non-Royal English regiment, the 12th Foot were, upon becoming the Suffolk Regiment in 1881, required to change their yellow facings for white. In 1899, however, the former colour was restored and can be seen in P.W. Reynolds's last painting. Note the soldier's yellow cuffs — changed to round in 1882 but again pointed from 1902, and plain skirts at the back.

The badge seen in Fig I is that authorised in 1898 for wear on the foreign service helmet, silver for officers and brass for other ranks — but the latter later changed to white metal. Fig K shows men of the 1st Battalion in South Africa, 1900.

Also seen, and worn by the officer in the centre, is the Home Service pattern helmet as introduced in 1878. According to Colonel Webb this new headress was first worn by the 2nd Battalion when they furnished the 'Double Gate Guard' at Gosport on 26 May 1878. The familiar universal star plates worn in the helmet had in the



Fig J

centre the Castle in silver upon a red ground for officers, and the number '12' for the rank and file. After 1881 the plates of all ranks featured the Castle.

The officer's tunic now has the badges of rank on the shoulder cords (from 1880), crimson sashes are worn around the waist, and sword scabbards are steel for all ranks of officers in full dress.

Khaki service dress is also seen for the first time and the web equipment worn in both scarlet and KD order is that introduced in 1908. In 1911, according to Colonel Webb, the 1st Battalion (then serving on Malta) were ordered to remove from their khaki helmets the 'yellow cloth Castle patches' being worn. He also notes that in 1913 the same badge was restored to the battalion by Major-General the Honourable J.H. Byng at Cairo. Plate 7 (p.41), an illustration by Harry Payne, shown a private in full dress after 1902. **MI**



Fig K

SECRET ARMIES

THE BRITISH RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, 1940-44 (2)

GEOFFREY BRADFORD

IN THIS SECOND article on the top secret Auxiliary Units which would have served as the nucleus of a British resistance movement had the Germans invaded England, we look at the booby traps and incendiary devices they would have used, and their later history after the threat of invasion receded.

BOOBY TRAP MECHANISMS

Apart from using the 36M Grenade as a contrived booby trap, Auxiliary Units were issued with several special devices which could be used as a trap for the unwary or, given the right circumstances, as a self-induced act of sabotage.

The **pull switch** was a metal tube about 4 inches long containing a spring loaded striker head, held in place by a spring loaded release pin. When a pull of between 1 and 8lb was applied to this via a trip wire (a safety pin having been first removed) the striker would set off a percussion cap and detonator or detonating fuze to initiate a concealed explosive charge or mine.


A bracket was provided to enable the pull switch to be firmly attached to a tree or stake. When correctly installed, these were virtually foolproof. They could be adapted to enable charges to be fired electrically and it was possible to install them in such a way that, should the trip wire be discovered and cut, a further spring loaded wire would set off the explosive.

The **pressure switch** worked in a similar way, except that the spring loaded striker head was held in place by a thin soft metal spindle. A pressure of


about 40lb on a shearing pin was sufficient to cut through this spindle, allowing the strik-

er head to set off a cap, detonator or detonating fuze. Providing this switch was installed on a firm base, it could easily be sunk partially below ground, or the shear pin concealed by a light object which would not activate it until stepped upon.


Although not as common as pull and pressure switches, the **spring loaded switch** was a device which could be placed



Pull switch



Pressure switch



Pocket time incendiary

under a heavy object which, when removed, would set off a hidden charge.

'Stick Pencil' was the nickname given to another uncommon gadget, a metal tube, buried in the ground, containing a firing pin and catch. A .303 cartridge could be inserted in such a way that, when the protruding bullet was stepped upon, it was discharged into the unfortunate's foot.

Under operational conditions, it was likely that all these devices would have been used as booby-traps and to give an early warning of intruders approaching operational bases.

INCENDIARY DEVICES

Given the right sort of combustible target, a properly placed incendiary could do as

much, if not more, damage to an enemy's stores and supplies as an explosive, and the Auxunits were supplied with a variety of equipment for this purpose, which could be used, either on its own or in conjunction with explosives for greater effect.

Magnesium Incendiary

This was a black cylinder, 8in long and 2in in diameter containing powdered magnesium. It could be set off either instantaneously or by use of a time delay and it would burn for two minutes, giving off an intense heat and a dense smoke.

A.W. Bottle (76 Grenade)

Also known as the S.I.P. (self-igniting phosphorus) bottle, this was simply a half-pint clear glass bottle filled with a mixture of kerosene and rubber, and phosphorus, separated from

each other by a layer of water. The bottle was sealed with a 'Crown' cork, and when broken and the phosphorus exposed to the air, the contents ignited, giving off a foul smelling smoke and flame.

Although any fire could be extinguished with water, as soon as this dried up, the phosphorus would reignite. These were designed to be used as a fire and smoke grenade in vehicle ambushes, and a smaller version could be fired from a Northover projector. In storage, the crown corks were prone to corrosion, and a regular turn-over of supplies was recommended.

Pocket Time Incendiary

These consisted of a flat black or mottled green celluloid casing, 3in by 5in, of three tubes joined together, the outer tubes containing thermite powder with a short length of slow burning fuze at one end. The central tube contained a delay device of acid and copper wire, like that of the time-pencil, which released a striker to light the match head and fuses. The time delays were of the same order as those of time-pencils and, since these were subject to the same disadvantages of timing and unreliability, were recommended to be used in pairs.

Fire Pot

This was a brown, waxed paper covered cylinder, 2 1/4in in diameter and 3in high, containing a very strong incendiary mixture. It could be ignited by any time delay or booby-trap and would then produce a powerful flame for one minute, after which it would burn more quietly for about 15 minutes, giving

a hot local flame sufficiently intense to burst petrol tins.


TRAINING MANUAL

Initial training in all the preceding weapons and equipment was given, either at Colleshill House or locally, by the Regular Army support troops, and such knowledge was passed on, largely by word of mouth, and in the interests of security, no written training manuals were prepared.

However, in July 1942, membership of the Auxunits had grown to such an extent that some form of essential sabotage information was necessary as an aide-memoire for the volunteers. This was issued as a 42-page booklet, put together by a captain in the RE and which contained all the reminders that a well trained saboteur would need in practice.

As a doubtful concession to security, it was given a cover title which would not look out of place on any launter's bookshelf, *The Countryman's Diary-1939*. It was humorously issued 'With the Compliments of Highworth and Co' and stated that 'Highworth Fertilisers do their stuff unseen, until you see results!' This could well have become the operational motto of the three Auxunit Battalions!

As well as giving details on the packaging, characteristics and methods of use of the various explosives and equipment, the handbook contained many useful hints and tips, including the 'dos and don'ts' of handling explosives. A chapter was included on the best methods



of attacking certain targets, and how to calculate the amount of explosives required, followed by the admonition that 'If in doubt, double the calculated charge!'

Sketched drawings indicated how to destroy railway lines, petrol dumps and stores, and where to place charges to do the most damage to parked aeroplanes or vehicles.

Advice was also given on how to make improvised mines. 'Aim at killing by splinters, not by blast!' The use of an old motorcycle cylinder was highly recommended — 'The fins fly well!'

Apart from the standard government caution relating to the disclosure of information to unauthorised persons printed on the fly-leaf, there was no indication for whom this publication was intended, although one give-away missed censorship, for, when warning that some gelignite could deteriorate under damp storage conditions, the author stated that 'Auxunit packing is OK'.

LATER STAGES 1941-44

Once the German plans for an early invasion of Britain had been deferred, the immediate need for Auxunits had passed, and they were able to concentrate on the construction of their permanent bases, training and the acquisition of their weapons and explosives.

Local training largely took place at night, the patrols moving silently about their area, learning its characteristics and byeways and practising the arts of demolition on tree trunks, abandoned railway tracks and derelict vehicles. Any 'nasty sounds of banging' were attributed by the local population to stray enemy aircraft discharging their bomb load before returning home.

Patrols also participated in group training and frequently assisted the Military in their areas with exercises or 'schemes', often playing their intended roles of saboteurs or guerrillas.

The Auxunit poet celebrated one such exercise in verse, declaiming how his patrol embarked on boats on the River Tavy to attack the nearby RAF Station at Chivenor. Having placed their small charges on the runways, they departed unobserved. Later, during a feint attack on the main entrance, they were taken 'prisoner' and subjected to RAF hospitality in the Mess. Their captors were commiserating with them on their failed raid, when the delayed action

**THE COUNTRYMAN'S
DIARY - - - 1939**

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charges exploded.

As 1944 approached the threat of invasion receded, although the patrols were maintained in a state of readiness. Gradually, some of their stores, particularly PHE (Plastic High Explosive) and delay mechanisms were called in for use by the invasion troops or by the European Resistance. Meanwhile, the Intelligence Officers and their teams had been disbanded and posted to other units, many joining the SOE or SAS Regiment, where they applied their skills in clandestine operations in occupied Europe.

It was considered, however, that there was a possibility, albeit remote, that the Germans could mount a counter-invasion against southern England, and Auxunits were alerted prior to D-Day. Some North Country patrols were moved to the Isle of Wight, which could have become a prime target, to increase the Auxunit presence there, and they carried out some preparatory work which, in the event, was not needed. Patrols in the south-west were also put on stand-

by against a possible enemy air landing.

Disbandment

By November 1944, the fighting on the Continent was sufficiently advanced for the Auxiliary Units to be stood down. Their weapons and explosives (some, not all) were collected, any doubtful explosives being carefully destroyed.

In that month, most County battalions held a standing parade in their County town, where they were addressed by their Colonel-Commandant and individually presented with 'Home Guard' certificates (although they were still not members). Of greater personal value to them were the letters sent to each Auxiliary which confirmed and emphasised the secret nature of their duties. What had begun in secrecy ended in secrecy, and it was not until April 1945 that the existence of the British Resistance Movement was released to the Press.

When Defence Medals were issued to members of the Home Forces, Auxiliaries were overlooked, as they still had no official standing.

CONCLUSION

Fortunately, it will never be known how effective the Auxiliary Units would have been in practice, but it is possible to speculate, based on the knowledge gained from the experiences of the European Resistance Movement.

Certainly, Auxunits had a head start on these, they were well organised, well trained and well supplied with the necessities for underground activities. It is generally considered that their effectiveness would have been high in comparison with their numbers, although the patrols themselves thought that their active life would not last longer than a few weeks.

Whilst casualties would have been serious and inevitable, there is no doubt that some members would have survived the initial actions and that these would either have gone to ground or returned unobtrusively to their homes, during the confusion of the early occupation.

These men could have formed the nucleus of any National Resistance, acting as leaders to recruit and train the population as the harshness of the occupation became felt. Once the hidden stores of arms had been used up, patrols would have depended upon captured weapons.

Like their European counterparts, any movement would have suffered from the activities of collaborators and informers, and all Auxiliaries were aware of the possible effect that their actions would have had on their families, friends and neighbours if reprisals were inflicted.

Hopefully, resistance would have continued, even although occupied Britain became part of Greater Germany.

As Steinbeck wrote of the Norwegian Resistance: 'Can the flies conquer the flypaper?'

MI

Acknowledgement

This article has been prepared from the author's own knowledge and experience, but acknowledgement must be made to David Lampe, author of *The Last Dutch*, published by Cassell in 1968, whose painstaking research uncovered most, if not all, of the secrets of the British Resistance Organisation and which is commended to any serious student of this subject.

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HORACE LOCKWOOD Smith-Dorrien was born in 1858, the eleventh child of a family of fifteen. He was educated at Egypt House, Isle of Wight, and later at Harrow. He entered the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, on 26 February 1876 and was subsequently gazetted to the 95th (Derbyshire) Regiment of Foot in January 1877.

In 1878, Lieutenant-General Frederic Augustus Thesiger, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South Africa (who would inherit the title of Lord Chelmsford on the death of his father), cabled the War Office requesting additional 'special service' officers for duty in Southern Africa. Thesiger was the 'Colonel' of the 95th, and he requested three officers from the Regiment, a request which was denied by the Regiment's Lieutenant-Colonel. Smith-Dorrien was serving as the Regimental Adjutant and was fully aware of the request and the response. Using extreme guile, he sent a telegram to the War Office offering his services at the Cape in any appropriate capacity. His little deception bore fruit and within three years he was en route to South Africa on board the *Edinburgh Castle*.

On reaching Durban, Smith-Dorrien was detailed for transport duties and soon found himself controlling convoys of supplies being moved up to the requisitioned Mission Station of Rorke's Drift on the Natal/Zululand border. The supplies were part of Chelmsford's

Officers of the Sherwood Foresters, India, February 1891. Captain Smith-Dorrien is seated fourth from the left in the centre row.

'The Man Who Disobeyed'?

JOHN YOUNG
Paintings by PETER DENNIS

SHOULD HE HAVE won a Victoria Cross at Isandlwana or Omdurman? Did he save the British Expeditionary Force from a singular defeat in 1914? There is still controversy over the career of General Sir Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien. Is he one of the British Army's unsung heroes, or does he deserve the sobriquet 'The Man Who Disobeyed'?

preparation for the now inevitable invasion of Zululand following the declaration of the ultimatum of the Governor of Cape Colony, Sir Henry Bartle Edward Fiere, to the Zulu King, Cetshwayo kaMpande.

On 11 January 1879, British forces invaded Zululand in three attacking columns, with two other columns being held in reserve. Smith-Dorrien remained at Rorke's Drift ensuring the supply of No 3 Column, which was commanded by Brevet Colonel R.T. Glyn, 1st Battalion, 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment of Foot and accompanied by Lord Chelmsford. The Column had initial success by defeating a small Zulu force on 12 January then, on the 19th halted on the slopes of the mountain of Isandlwana and established a staging camp prior to any further advance.

Two days later, on 21 January, Smith-Dorrien rode to the camp at Isandlwana to supervise the return of empty wagons to Rorke's Drift for resupply. Around midnight, he was summoned to Lord Chelmsford and given a dispatch to convey to Brevet

Colonel A.W. Durnford, Royal Engineers, Commander of No 2 Column — one of the reserve forces. Smith-Dorrien rode back to Rorke's Drift, arriving just before dawn on 22 January 1879. He found Durnford about to strike camp and relocate his force of native irregulars. The dispatch intimated to Durnford that he, together with a part of his force, should reinforce the camp at Isandlwana since it was Chelmsford's intention to leave the encampment with a part of No 3 Column to engage what was suspected to be a large force of Zulus found in a reconnaissance.

Smith-Dorrien remained at Rorke's Drift to check on the progress of some items — rawhide thongs which were being stretched on a contraption resembling a gallows. Having seen to this he then begged 11 rounds of revolver ammunition from Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead, Commander of 'B' Company, 2nd Battalion, 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment of Foot, fearing that 'a big fight was expected'. Having acquired the ammunition he rode on to Isandlwana. On his arrival he witnessed a

verbal exchange between Durnford and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel H.B. Pulleine of the 1st/24th, whom Chelmsford had left in command of the encampment. Durnford apparently requested infantry support for a reconnaissance he wished to undertake to establish the whereabouts of a force of Zulus who had been in the nearby vicinity of the camp. Pulleine remonstrated: his orders were to defend the camp and the only regular infantry he had was five companies of the 1st/24th and one company of the 2nd/24th. A compromise was reached whereby Pulleine agreed to commit his infantry if Durnford encountered any difficulties. Whilst skirting the Nqulu plateau, a troop of Durnford's Natal Native Horse chanced upon a Zulu impi of some 25,000 warriors. In doing so the patrol had pre-empted an attack planned by the Zulus for the following day, the 23rd. The rest is history.

The causes for the defeat still intrigue historians, but one of them must have been the extended lines between the troops and their reserve ammunition in the camp. It is here that we find Lieutenant Smith-Dorrien. With no specific duties to perform, he collected a number of troops, such as horse-holders and officers' servants, and set about opening ammunition boxes to hurry the supply to those on the firing line. Whilst doing so he was approached by Quartermaster E. Bloomfield of the 2nd/24th, who admonished him, saying, 'For heaven's sake, don't take that man, for it belongs to our Battalion'. To which Smith-Dorrien replied, 'Hang it all,



you don't want a requisition now, do you?' Bloomfield was to die shortly after the exchange, issuing ammunition, presumably to the single Company of his Battalion.

With the ox-drawn transport hitched-up and making for the road back to Rorke's Drift, Smith-Dorrien mounted his horse and joined the flight, whilst the 24th made their gallant stand. He rode through the Zulu mass, which had cut the line of retreat, completely ignored, later putting this good fortune down to the fact that he was wearing a blue patrol jacket and was not clearly identifiable as a 'red soldier'.

Smith-Dorrien rode across the broken ground and reached the Buffalo River at 'Fugitives' Drift'. Here he saw Lieutenant Teignmouth Melville, 1st/24th, carrying his precious charge — the Queen's Colour of the 1st/24th. Smith-Dorrien paused to assist a wounded mounted infantryman and started to apply a tourniquet. As he was doing so he received a shouted warning from Brevet Major S. Smith, Royal Artillery, that the Zulus were upon them. Within a second the three were surrounded by Zulus, who assailed Smith and the mounted infantryman, as well as Smith-Dorrien's horse. Blazing at the Zulus with his revolver, Smith-Dorrien hurled himself into the swollen waters of the Buffalo.

On reaching the dubious safety of the Natal bank he came upon an exhausted Transport Conductor named Hamer. Seeing his plight, Smith-Dorrien caught a stray horse and put Hamer upon it, enabling him to make good his escape. Smith-Dorrien was now under constant fire from the Zulu bank. He gained the height of the rock face only to find a new threat of some 20 Zulus who had crossed upriver and were now intent on killing him. The Zulus pursued him whilst he kept them at bay with cautious use of his revolver, and after some three miles the Zulus abandoned their pursuit. It was sunset before Smith-Dorrien made the safety of the laager at Helpmakaar, having covered a distance of almost 20 miles on foot.

On the evidence of other survivors Smith-Dorrien was recommended for the award of the VC, but the award was denied. In his own words and with the hindsight of the horrors of the First World War he stated, '...for any trivial act of good Samaritanism I may have performed that day would not have



General Smith-Dorrien in full dress, 1912. (G.T. Rice Collection.)

earned an MC, much less a VC...'

The following day, 23 January, he returned to Rorke's Drift to find the gallant band who had held the post against the Zulu onslaught. To his disgust he also found that his 'gallows' had been used to execute two Zulus.

Shortly afterwards, whilst garrisoning the fort at Helpmakaar, Smith-Dorrien was taken ill with typhoid, and for two months his life was hung in the balance. When he regained his health he took part in the advance to the Zulu capital, Ulundi, witnessing the final battle of the Zulu War from a laager on the south bank of the Mfolozi River.

He returned to the 95th, then serving at the Curragh, Ireland, and was subsequently stationed at Aldershot and the Battalion's Depot at Derby. In 1881 the Cardwell Reforms transformed the then 95th into the 2nd Battalion, The Sherwood Foresters (The Notts & Derby Regt). In 1882 the regiment was ordered to Egypt to suppress the revolt of the Egyptian Army under Arabi Pasha, by which time Smith-Dorrien had risen to the rank of Captain. Initially he was

appointed Chief of Police in Alexandria, and subsequently commanded a mounted infantry squadron with great success.

Smith-Dorrien returned to Egypt in early 1884, when he elected to join the Egyptian Army. He served in the Nile and Suakin expeditions and in March 1885 was given command of a company of British mounted infantry. For his actions at the battle of Ginnis, 30 December 1885, he was awarded the newly instituted Distinguished Service Order and the Order of Osmanieh, 4th Class. For his services to the Egyptian Army he received the Order of Medjidieh, 4th Class. In February 1887, he returned to Britain to undergo the Staff College Course and, having completed this, he returned to his Regiment — then serving in India.

Smith-Dorrien served in the Tirah Campaign, India 1897-98, for which he received the brevet rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. On his journey home to Britain he received news that unrest had broken out in the Sudan. He stopped at Cairo and appealed to the Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, Herbert Kitchener, for an appointment;

the request went unheeded. Smith-Dorrien continued his homeward journey but the following month he received an order from Kitchener — he was needed in the Sudan.

On 2 September 1898 Smith-Dorrien was in command of the 13th Sudanese Battalion of the Egyptian Army at the Battle of Omdurman. His men bore the brunt of the Dervish assault, sustaining the most severe casualties of the Anglo-Egyptian force. For his services in the Sudan, Smith-Dorrien was rewarded with a brevet colonelcy, and given command of the 1st Battalion of the Sherwood Foresters, then serving in Malta. In November 1899 the battalion was ordered to South Africa in the wake of the outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Boer.

In December, Smith-Dorrien received command of an infantry brigade. He was present at the action of Paardeberg, the capture of Blonfontein and various minor engagements. He then served in the Eastern Transvaal and on the Swazi border. On 27 April 1901 he was promoted to the rank of Major-General, post-dated to February 1900, and appointed Adjutant-General in India. He held this post until April 1903, when he was given command of the 4th Division in Baluchistan. In 1907 he was selected for the command of the Aldershot Division with the rank of Lieutenant-General. In 1911 he was appointed Aide-de-Camp General to King George V and accompanied the King on a tour of India. In February 1912 Smith-Dorrien was appointed to the Southern Command, and in August of that year promoted to General.

On the day that war was declared against Germany — 5 August 1914 — Smith-Dorrien was given a command in the Home Defence Army. On 17 August news came that Sir James Grierson, the Commander of II Corps, BEF, had died from a heart attack. Kitchener, now C-in-C of British Army, allocated the vacant command to Smith-Dorrien. On 21 August he assumed active command of the Corps.

It was then positioned between the towns of Mons, Frameries, Douai and Boussa. Due to a lack of communication, Smith-Dorrien was unaware that the French Fifth Army had been forced back by the Germans, leaving the BEF in a vulnerable position. Also ignorant of the fact was the BEF commander, Field Marshal Sir John French. French was of the

opinion that the German strength in that sector amounted to one or two corps, reinforced by a cavalry division—a complete miscalculation for opposing them was an entire German Army Group, commanded by General von Kluck. Smith-Dorrien expressed his concern regarding the danger of holding the Mons salient, with which Field Marshal French concurred, and ordered a withdrawal to the south of Mons. On 23 August, the Germans attempted to outflank the BEF's position. The accurate and rapid fire of the British troops convinced the Germans that they were facing a large number of machine-guns.

At 3.00 am, 24 August, Smith-Dorrien received a message from his Chief Staff Officer—French had ordered the retreat of the BEF. The fighting in Smith-Dorrien's sector was intense, the battle for the town of Fiameries was hard fought, as was the flank near Elouges where the 15th Brigade, II Corps, lost over 1,100 men. In two days of fierce fighting II Corps had sustained 3,784 casualties. Smith-Dorrien received a dispatch from French ordering a retreat on the town of Le Cateau. On reaching Le Cateau at 3.30 pm on 25 August, he found that French had already withdrawn his headquarters to St Quentin, 26 miles to the south. Smith-Dorrien waited anxiously for Douglas Haig's I Corps which was retreating parallel to him. II Corps comprised some 60% reservists, had fought desperately for two days and retreated 20 miles under the intense heat of the scorching sun, so Smith-Dorrien could see his men were fatigued. The evening brought little relief when a heavy storm broke over their position drenching the men. Rumour and counter-rumour abounded as to the fate of Haig's Corps.

Early in the morning of 26 August, General E.H.H. Allenby, commanding the Cavalry Division, arrived, his men and their mounts exhausted and scattered over ten miles. Smith-Dorrien then made a momentous decision: he would retreat no further—his men would stand and fight. Allenby placed himself under Smith-Dorrien's command as did General T. D'O. Snow, commanding the 4th Division, which had just arrived from England. At 5.00 am French was informed of Smith-Dorrien's bold decision, which was in strict contravention of the order to retreat. French replied in a dispatch: 'If you can

hold your ground the situation appears likely to improve. Fourth Division must co-operate. French troops are taking offensive on right of 1st Corps. Although you are given a free hand as to method this telegram is not intended to convey the impression that I am not anxious for you to carry out the retirement, and you must make every endeavour to do so.'

Smith-Dorrien now had under his command less than 80,000 men. Von Kluck commanded at least 180,000.

Smith-Dorrien allowed his forces to rest, having first seen to their dispositions. A runner brought word that French wished to speak to him on a telephone some half-mile away at Bertry railway station; Smith-Dorrien hurried there. Sir Henry Wilson, Sub-Chief of General Staff, informed him that he was to break off the action as soon as possible to which Smith-Dorrien replied he would endeavour to do so, but foresaw that it would be difficult. Wilson bade him good luck and he returned to his H.Q.

The action had already commenced in the town of Le Cateau, where the British defenders were evacuating the town under heavy fire. For six hours II Corps held their line stubbornly, contesting every inch of ground, holding off the fierce assaults of an entire Germany Army ranged against them. With every unit committed, the Corps came under intense artillery fire, in some cases at virtual point-blank range. With his casualties mounting, Smith-Dorrien ordered a withdrawal but, unfortunately, the order was not relayed to some of his foremost forces. However, these resolute men, numbering less than a thousand, held up the German advance. The Corps retired, but the Germans, perhaps fearing a ploy, did not take advantage of the situation. Smith-Dorrien's command had lost 5,212 men and a further 2,600 taken prisoner. The gallant stand at Le Cateau had broken the German impetus, and allowed the BEF a chance to regroup.

General Smith-Dorrien in September 1926 shortly after his return from Gibraltar.



Peter Dennis' reconstructions on the back cover show, top, Lieutenant Smith-Dorrien at Isandlwana, January 1879. He wears the standard tea-stained helmet, blue infantry officer's patrol jacket and Bedford cord trousers. The belt and ammunition pouch for his .45 Webley revolver is slung across his body in the popular style of the time. On his left hip is an 1855 pattern infantry officer's sword with brass hilt and guard and steel scabbard. Bottom, General Smith-Dorrien as commander of II Corps, Le Cateau, August 1914. He wears standard General's uniform and insignia with the 1896 pattern steel-hilted sword and carries a swagger cane.

Initially, Smith-Dorrien was applauded for his ingenuity. His adversary, von Kluck, later stated, 'I tried very hard to outflank them, but I could not do so. If I had succeeded the war would have been won.' The High Command subsequently changed its view on General Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien: he had disobeyed a direct order in not continuing to retreat. He remained on the Western Front until May 1915 when he was summoned to return to England by Kitchener. He held various commands in England until November 1915 when he was ordered to take over operations in German East Africa. On the voyage out he was taken seriously ill with pneumonia, as a consequence of which the South African General Smuts was appointed in his stead. His illness rendered him unfit for military operations but by September 1918 he was considered fit enough to be appointed Governor of Gibraltar, a position he held for five years.

He died on 12th August 1930 in a car accident and is buried at Berkhamsted, Hertfordshire.

Smith-Dorrien has, in recent years, acquired the sobriquet 'The Man who Disobeyed'. This writer concurs with the opinion of the poet Sir Henry Newbolt who wrote, 'Smith-Dorrien saved us... simply by being himself...' Who are the 'us'? I leave you to draw your own conclusions. Suffice it to say that if Smith-Dorrien had not stood at Le Cateau, von Kluck could have been in Paris or the BEF could have been swept into the Channel. Sir Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien is a forgotten national hero, scorned by the High Command for having done what he thought to be right.

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Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien

Isandlwana 1879



Le Cateau 1914

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